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ARTICLES
Federalism and Equal Citizenship: The
Constitutional Case for D.C. Statehood
JESSICA BULMAN-POZEN & OLATUNDE C.A. JOHNSON*

As the question of D.C. statehood commands national attention, the
legal discourse remains stilted. The constitutional question we should be
debating is not whether statehood is permitted but whether it is required.
Commentators have been focusing on the wrong constitutional provisions. The Founding document and the Twenty-Third Amendment do not
resolve D.C.’s status. The Reconstruction Amendments—and the principle of federated, equal citizenship they articulate—do. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, as glossed by subsequent amendments,
not only establishes birthright national citizenship and decouples it from
race and caste but also makes state citizenship a constitutive component
of equal national citizenship. Because the Founding architecture of federalism has remained in place as political rights have become integral to
U.S. citizenship, national citizenship must be realized in part through the
states. All Americans living in the United States, including in the District
of Columbia, are constitutionally entitled to claim state citizenship where
they reside.
Beyond realizing a constitutional obligation, Congress’s admission of
D.C. to the Union would serve American federalism. Many of federalism’s normative values—from creating spheres of minority rule, to satisfying local preferences, to providing laboratories of experimentation—
are not well-realized in practice. But the very features of D.C. that have
long impeded its recognition as a self-governing political community
introduce new possibilities for achieving these values. As a plurality
Black state, D.C. would provide a novel forum for federalism to empower
people of color. And as the nation’s first city-state, D.C. would facilitate
subsidiarity by merging federalism and localism.
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INTRODUCTION
Two hundred twenty years after Washington, D.C. became the United States’
seat of government and local residents lost the franchise, D.C. statehood has become
a prominent part of the national conversation. The House of Representatives voted
in April 2021 to carve out a federal enclave as the U.S. capital and to grant statehood
to the surrounding area of Washington, Douglass Commonwealth.1 Upon the Bill’s
enactment, 700,000 District residents would enjoy both local self-rule and representation in Congress. As the Washington, D.C. Admission Act stalls in the Senate,
politicians and pundits have questioned its legality, arguing that Congress may
not grant statehood through simple legislation but must instead propose a constitutional amendment.2 Statehood proponents have rushed to answer the constitutional objections.3
This framing of the national conversation is stilted. The real constitutional
question about D.C. statehood is not whether it is permitted but whether it is
required. Should a conscientious member of Congress, committed to fulfilling
her oath to support the Constitution of the United States, believe herself bound to
vote for D.C. statehood? Although this question is closer than whether statehood
is constitutionally permissible, the answer is yes.
It has long been recognized that the nation’s capital jettisons principles of
American federalism and representative democracy. As D.C. residents seek to
regulate local issues, a national legislature in which they lack any representation
overrides their decisions.4 That a majority of D.C.’s residents are people of color
makes such domination a “primary civil rights and social justice question” as
well.5 Those who defend this state of affairs must invert their usual commitments.
Self-professed champions of federalism insist upon the unchecked prerogatives

1. Washington, D.C. Admission Act, H.R. 51, 117th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives,
Apr. 22, 2021).
2. See, e.g., R. HEWITT PATE, D.C. STATEHOOD: NOT WITHOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
(1993); Zachary Evans, Manchin Says D.C. Statehood Requires Constitutional Amendment, Not Senate
Vote, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 30, 2021, 7:41 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/news/manchin-says-d-cstatehood-requires-constitutional-amendment-not-senate-vote/ [https://perma.cc/A5M5-PZN3].
3. See, e.g., Letter from Scholars of the United States Constitution to Congressional Leaders
(May 22, 2021), https://www.scribd.com/document/509015647/Letter-to-Congressional-Leaderson-Constitutionality-of-Statehood-for-Washington-D-C-May-2021.
4. Among other local legislation, Congress has blocked a needle exchange program to combat HIV/
AIDS, a ballot measure legalizing the sale of marijuana, and the use of D.C. funds to provide abortion
coverage for low-income women. See, e.g., Karl Evers-Hillstrom & Aris Folley, Congress Overrides DC
Voters, Keeps Sales of Marijuana Illegal in District, HILL (Mar. 11, 2022, 9:00 AM), https://thehill.com/
homenews/house/597816-congress-overrides-dc-voters-keeps-sales-of-marijuana-illegal-in-district/
[https://perma.cc/W2C5-BEQV]; Letter from the ACLU to Elijah Cummings, Chairman, U.S. H.
Comm. on Oversight & Reform & Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, U.S. H. Comm. on Oversight &
Reform (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-statement-dc-statehood-hearing [https://
perma.cc/FPY6-H782]; see also Philip G. Schrag, The Future of District of Columbia Home Rule, 39
CATH. U. L. REV. 311, 314 (1990) (“By legislating for the District, members of Congress can take a
highly visible stand without actually restricting the activities of any voters in their home districts.”).
5. Jesse L. Jackson, Foreword: The State of New Columbia – A Call for Justice and Freedom, 39
CATH. U. L. REV. 307, 310 (1990).
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of the federal government. Advocates of self-determination abroad justify its
denial in the shadow of the White House. Defenders of citizenship as a unique repository of rights and privileges make an exception for citizens living near the
seat of American government.
Meanwhile, those who indict D.C.’s status as a civil rights tragedy, a departure
from democratic principles, even an international law violation, encounter the
refrain: this is what the Constitution requires. When proposals have been made to
grant D.C. congressional representation or more autonomous self-government,
for example, sympathetic jurists and scholars have lamented that D.C.’s residents
cannot enjoy the rights that the Constitution confers through the states because
D.C. is not a state.6
This response, however, gets the point exactly backward. Rather than insist
on the fundamental importance of statehood to deny D.C. residents full citizenship, the centrality of federalism to equal citizenship is reason for D.C.’s admission to the Union.
The Constitution has always channeled representative government through the
states, both directly as a means of local self-rule and indirectly as the basis of
national representation. For the Founding century, this approach accorded with
an understanding of state citizenship as primary. But Reconstruction marked an
inversion of the state-federal relationship and the transformation of state citizenship into a constitutive feature of American citizenship. Once the Constitution—
through both the Reconstruction Amendments7 and later amendments recognizing the “right of citizens of the United States” to vote8—established birthright
national citizenship and tethered political rights to this status, it also required state
citizenship as a component of national citizenship. The full meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is thus informed by both the federalism of 1789 and the citizenship of the Civil Rights Movement. To unite the
Founding’s reliance on states as sites of representation with the twentieth century’s tying of citizenship to the franchise, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
6. See, e.g., Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 72 (D.D.C. 2000) (per curiam) (“[M]any courts
have found a contradiction between the democratic ideals upon which this country was founded and the
exclusion of District residents from congressional representation. All, however, have concluded that it is
the Constitution . . . that create[s] the contradiction.”); Views on Legis. Making the Dist. of Columbia a
Cong. Dist., 33 Op. O.L.C. 156, 159–60 (2009) [hereinafter OLC D.C. Representation Opinion]
(“Congress may not by statute give the District of Columbia voting representation in the House[] . . .
[because] the District is not a ‘State’ within the meaning of the Composition Clause.”); Jonathan Turley,
Too Clever by Half: The Unconstitutionality of Partial Representation of the District of Columbia in
Congress, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 305, 350 (2008). See generally LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER & GUYURIEL CHARLES, THE US CONSTITUTION MEETS DEMOCRATIC THEORY: THE PUZZLING CASES OF
PUERTO RICO AND D.C. 7 (2020) (footnotes omitted), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
03/Puerto-Rico-DC-Statehood-Final-Draft-March-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KDL-6AGV] (“The
argument against voting rights for District residents is difficult to reconcile with democratic theory,
in which self-government is essential to democratic legitimacy and effectuated through periodic
elections. . . . [But reformers] have been unable to overcome the fundamental textual problem that
the District is not considered a state for voting purposes.”).
7. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
8. Id. amends. XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
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guarantee of equal citizenship must be a guarantee of federated citizenship.
Washington, D.C. is the only place in the continental United States where this
guarantee has yet to be realized.9
Although D.C. statehood is a constitutional imperative, it is not a judicially enforceable one.10 Courts have thus been right to reject arguments that D.C. must be
treated as a state in the absence of a congressional act. This is not to suggest that
D.C.’s status has been straightforward for the judiciary. Can a D.C. resident sue
and be sued in federal court despite Article III’s express reference to “Citizens of
different States”?11 Does congressional regulation of commerce “among the several States”12 extend to D.C.? Yes, and yes.13 But are D.C. residents guaranteed
representation in Congress? No, because D.C. is not a state.14 While these and
9. Although portions of the constitutional argument we advance in this Article have implications for
Puerto Rico and other ostensibly “unincorporated” territories, we address only D.C. The constitutional
objections to D.C. statehood are grounded in its status as the seat of government and do not pertain to
territories. At the same time, there are not questions about D.C. residents’ consent to statehood or their
constitutional citizenship. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 261 (1901) (arguing that, unlike
Puerto Rico, D.C. “had been subject to the Constitution, and was a part of the United States,” and the
“Constitution had attached to it irrevocably”); Aaron C. Davis, District Voters Overwhelmingly Approve
Referendum to Make D.C. the 51st State, WASH. POST. (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/dc-politics/district-voters-overwhelmingly-approve-referendum-to-make-dc-the-51st-state/
2016/11/08/ff2ca5fe-a213-11e6-8d63-3e0a660f1f04_story.html. It is important to note that we agree
with critics of the irredeemably racist Insular Cases. See, e.g., Christina Duffy Ponsa-Kraus, The
Insular Cases Run Amok: Against Constitutional Exceptionalism in the Territories, 131 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 6–7) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=4016666 [https://perma.cc/H9EE-E7W2]) (arguing against the rehabilitation of the
Insular Cases, including Downes, because they are “racist-imperialist” and have created an ongoing
“crisis of political legitimacy in the unincorporated territories”). Our point here is simply that the legal
arguments for territorial statehood require distinct analysis. See generally SAM ERMAN, ALMOST
CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND EMPIRE (2019) (exploring constitutional
debates about Puerto Rico’s status).
10. As others have observed, “Congress’ admission of new states is the paradigmatic political
question,” and courts traditionally refrain from adjudicating questions the Constitution exclusively
commits to a coordinate branch. Equality for the District of Columbia: Discussing the Implications of S.
132, the New Columbia Admission Act of 2013: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affs., 113th Cong. 75 (2014) (statement of Viet D. Dinh, Founding Partner, Bancroft
PLLC) [hereinafter Dinh Testimony]; see id. (“It is difficult to imagine judicially manageable standards
for assessing the admission of [D.C. as a state]. And any decision would express disrespect for the
political branches while risking the embarrassment and uncertainty of multiple branches’ conflicting
judgments on a state’s existence.”).
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
12. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. See Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 600 (1949) (affirming
congressional power to treat D.C. as a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); Stoutenburgh v.
Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 148 (1889) (affirming congressional power to treat D.C. as a state for purposes
of interstate commerce). Congress sometimes—but not always—treats D.C. as a state in legislation that
does not directly implement constitutional provisions as well. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1257(b) (providing,
for purposes of certiorari to the Supreme Court, that “the term ‘highest court of a State’ includes the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals”); 28 U.S.C. § 1343(b)(1) (providing, for purposes of civil rights
lawsuits, that “the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a State”).
14. See, e.g., Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 65–68 (D.D.C. 2000) (per curiam) (rejecting an
argument that D.C. residents have a constitutional right to elect congressional representatives); OLC
D.C. Representation Opinion, supra note 6 (concluding that Congress cannot treat D.C. as a state for
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other tensions in the case law underscore D.C.’s problematic status, the judiciary
is correct that statehood is a quintessential political question. Courts cannot
require Congress to grant D.C. statehood any more than they can countermand a
grant of statehood Congress makes. The decision to admit a new state is a congressional one.
When attention turns to Congress, however, arguments become permissive:
many scholars and commentators have correctly argued that Congress may grant
D.C. statehood, but they have not recognized Congress’s constitutional obligation
to do so. One reason is simply that “we have forgotten the very idea of affirmative
legislative constitutional duties.”15 Another is that the constitutional debate about
D.C.’s status focuses on the Founding Era.16 As in discussions of federalism more
generally, discussions of D.C. statehood anachronistically displace the work of
Reconstruction with the Constitutional Convention.17 The Founding document
did establish the nation’s architecture of federalism as well as D.C.-specific
requirements that continue to inform questions of statehood, but D.C.’s status can
only be properly analyzed in light of the Fourteenth Amendment and the constitutional transformations it initiated. Congress bears a responsibility to reconcile
these constitutional guarantees.18
After Part I describes critical Founding commitments, Part II explores how the
remaking of these commitments through the Reconstruction Amendments and
their citizenship-perfecting progeny has imposed a constitutional obligation on
Congress to admit D.C. as a state. Because constitutional development did not
end with Reconstruction, Part III considers a possible objection to statehood
located, paradoxically, in the Twenty-Third Amendment’s conferral of presidential electors on the District. The Amendment does not pose a constitutional barrier
to admission, but the current admissions bill should be altered: Congress should
assign the Electoral College votes the Amendment confers on the “District constituting the seat of Government of the United States”19 to the winner of the national
purposes of congressional representation). See also District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420
(1973) (“Whether the District of Columbia constitutes a ‘State or Territory’ within the meaning of any
particular statutory or constitutional provision depends upon the character and aim of the specific
provision involved.”).
15. JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION: RECONSTRUCTING THE
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 84 (2022) (arguing that we should recover the tradition of
affirmative legislative constitutional duties).
16. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, The Constitutionality of D.C. Statehood, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
160, 163 (1991).
17. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the
Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2001, 2015 (2003) (describing the Supreme Court’s
“federalism revival” of the 1990s as a “chillingly amnesic reproduction of antebellum conceptions of state
sovereignty”).
18. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (arguing for congressional enforcement of
constitutional norms that the federal judiciary does not enforce due to institutional concerns); see also
FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 15, at 84 (arguing for congressional constitutional duties); Paul Brest,
The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 587
(1975) (arguing for a congressional duty to assess the constitutionality of proposed legislation).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
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popular vote. Such a decision would not only conform to the text of the TwentyThird Amendment but also appropriately recognize the District as a capital city
belonging to the entire American people.
Turning to political questions attending statehood, Part IV first addresses familiar arguments that admitting D.C. to the Union would be a partisan power
grab. It then inverts the Article’s focus on what American federalism has to say
about D.C. statehood, asking instead what D.C. statehood might teach us about
contemporary American federalism. Many of the normative values associated
with federalism are not well-realized in practice, but the very features of
Washington, D.C. that have long impeded its recognition as a self-governing political community—in particular, the perception of the District as “too black” and
“too urban”20—introduce new possibilities for achieving these values. As a plurality Black state, D.C. would provide a novel opportunity for American federalism to instantiate minority rule. And as the nation’s first city-state, D.C. would
yoke federalism to localism in ways that could facilitate meaningful subsidiarity
and democratic experimentation.
I. FOUNDING COMMITMENTS
When it comes to D.C. statehood, the most important point about the eighteenthcentury Constitution is frequently elided: it no longer defines the terms of the Union.
In this Article, we focus on amendments that have transformed the constitutional
order and, with it, the question of statehood. If it is wrong to orient contemporary discussions of the District exclusively around the pre-Reconstruction Constitution, however, it remains instructive to begin there.
Critical Founding commitments—in particular, the establishment of federalism to ensure both local self-government and national representation—persist to
this day and underscore the District’s anomalous status.21 As Representative
Ebenezer Elmer of New Jersey lamented shortly after D.C. became the capital:
“We have most happily combined the democratic representative with the federal
principle in the Union of the States. But the inhabitants of this territory, under the
exclusive legislation of Congress, partake of neither the one nor the other.”22
Although this tension grew pronounced as Washington, D.C. gained population
and political identity, it was not practically anomalous when Representative
Elmer spoke. At the time, the nation was a mere seventeen states, with much of
the country’s landmass organized as not-yet-state territories. Understandings of citizenship were also limited, and there was a widespread norm of non-enfranchisement even
for those recognized as citizens.
The District thus arose as the seat of government for a nation in which the federal representative principle was more a prospective than a realized constitutional
20. 124 CONG. REC. 26345 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
21. See Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996) (defining an
“anomalous zone” as “a geographical area in which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as
embodying fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended”).
22. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 910 (1805).
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practice. Just as territories would only later be made states and citizens would
only later be enfranchised as a matter of course, nothing in D.C.’s establishment
as a non-state of non-voting citizens precluded future statehood and enfranchisement. This Part describes Founding Era federalism and citizenship both to contextualize
D.C.’s creation and to explicate the original constitutional commitments that remain pertinent to the question of statehood.
A. FEDERALISM AND THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT

It would be difficult to overstate the significance of federalism to the constitutional design. Together with the separation of powers, it was the animating structural
principle of the original document. States would be autonomous governments, sovereigns with a direct connection to their people and a responsibility for the majority of
American governance. They would also provide the mechanism for national representation, with the selection of the President, Senators, and Representatives all channeled through the states. These interrelated understandings of federalism—as local
self-government and as the basis for national representation—permeate the constitutional design. They also underscore the tensions inherent in the creation of the
District. As the Founders well recognized, the proposed seat of government fit uneasily into the constitutional plan insofar as it rendered Congress a local legislature and
denied political representation to all of the Americans residing there.
1. “Splitting the Atom of Sovereignty”23
Federalism appears in the Constitution, first, as an organizing principle for
self-government. Even as the Constitution established a national government, it
recognized states as separate sovereigns with their own particular relationship to
their inhabitants.24 While federal powers were enumerated in the Constitution,
state powers were plenary, limited only by the small number of Union-preserving
restrictions imposed by Article I, Section Ten and Article IV.25 The Tenth
Amendment, which indicates that powers not constitutionally delegated to the
United States or prohibited to the states “are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people”26 serves as a textual locus for these commitments.
Although the Founders’ federalism has changed dramatically—both in its practical operation and in its legal contours—since the eighteenth century, the commitment to states as sites of self-rule distinct from the federal government
remains to this day. Indeed, this aspect of American federalism underlies most
celebrations of the institution. Even as, to put it quite mildly, federalism in

23. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.”).
24. See generally ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010)
(analyzing the Founding belief that multiple independent levels of government could exist within a
single polity).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; id. art. IV.
26. Id. amend. X.
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practice has often failed to live up to the values associated with it,27 the status of
states as separate governments, responsible directly to their residents, underlies
accounts of federalism as a guarantor of individual liberty and checks and balances,28 a facilitator of locally-responsive democratic government,29 and a seedbed
of experimentation.30
In addition to preserving the states as autonomous governments, the Constitution
also structures national government around the states. The representative bodies of the
United States are populated through state-based elections. Thus, the Composition
Clause provides that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature”;31 these representatives are to be “apportioned among the several States.”32 The Senate is “composed of two Senators from each State”—elected
directly by the states’ people after the Seventeenth Amendment.33 The President, too,
is selected through state channels: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.”34
Despite fundamental transformations of the franchise and federalism alike
since the Founding, the national government is still composed through state-based
27. See infra Part II (discussing Reconstruction); infra Part IV (discussing contemporary federalism).
28. See, e.g., Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) (internal
quotations omitted) (“[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for
the protection of individuals. . . . ‘[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government [reduces] the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992)).
29. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91–92 (1995) (“[O]ne of the stronger
arguments for a decentralized political structure is that, to the extent the electorate is small, and elected
representatives are thus more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns, government is
brought closer to the people, and democratic ideals are more fully realized.”).
30. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.”). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in
Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1233–36 (1994) (discussing the role of states as laboratories); Deborah
Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (describing the ability of state governments to “pioneer[] new social and economic
programs” as a benefit of American federalism).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
32. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No person shall be a Representative who shall not
. . . be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”); id. amend. XIV, § 2 (retaining
apportionment “among the several States”).
33. Id. amend. XVII, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The
electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State legislatures.”); see also id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (providing that the “Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof,” subject to congressional alteration).
34. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also id. amend. XII (modifying Electoral College operations but retaining
state functions); id. amend. XXIII, § 1 (treating D.C. as “if it were a State” for Electoral College
purposes); infra Part III (discussing the Twenty-Third Amendment).
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elections. There is not a single office filled through a national vote. Representation in
the national government remains deeply tied to the “structure of statehood.”35
2. Creating the District of Columbia
Given the constitutional emphasis on states as both units of local self-government
and building blocks of national representation, the proposal to create a federal city
lacking both statehood and any representation in the federal government aroused
some concern during the Constitutional Convention and ratification process. In New
York, for instance, Delegate Thomas Tredwell argued that it “departs from every
principle of freedom, as far as the distance of the two polar stars from each other; for,
subjecting the inhabitants of that district to the exclusive legislation of Congress, in
whose appointment they have no share or vote, is laying a foundation on which may
be erected . . . tyranny.”36 Some offered amendments that would bring the District
more in line with principles of representative federalism. Following a territorial
model, for instance, Alexander Hamilton and others proposed furnishing congressional representation when the District’s population reached a certain size.37
These objections and proposals did not bear fruit. As ratified, the District
Clause provides simply: “Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles
square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress,
become the Seat of the Government of the United States.”38 In part, concerns
about a lack of representation were muted because no such district had been
named; at the time of ratification, Washington, D.C. had not yet been selected as
the capital, so only hypothetical Americans were being disenfranchised. Some
also insisted that the denial of representation was recompensed by the privilege

35. Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47 (D.D.C. 2000) (per curiam); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819) (“No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking
down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common
mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States.”).
36. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 402
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of Rep. Thomas Tredwell) [hereinafter 2 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES].
37. 5 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 189 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962)
(footnotes omitted) (Alexander Hamilton) (proposing “[t]hat When the Number of Persons in the
District of Territory to be laid out for the Seat of the Government of the United States, shall according to
the Rule for the Apportionment of Representatives and direct Taxes Amount to [ ] such District shall
cease to be parcel of the State granting the Same, and Provision shall be made by Congress for their
having a District Representation in that Body”); see also Letter from Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams
(Jan. 5, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MASSACHUSETTS 618, 621 (John P. Kaminski et al.
eds., 1998) (proposing representation for D.C. residents in the House); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note
36, at 410 (Melancton Smith) (proposing an amendment to recognize D.C. residents’ rights and
obligations). See generally AUGUSTUS B. WOODWARD, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
TERRITORY OF COLUMBIA: AS THEY RECENTLY APPEARED IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, UNDER THE
SIGNATURE OF EPAMINONDAS 8 (Washington, Samuel Harrison Smith 1801) (arguing for representation
for D.C. residents).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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of living in the capital city or that proximity to Congress might itself constitute
representation.39 Above all, concerns about District residents were eclipsed by
the felt need to protect a fledgling federal government. The Philadelphia Mutiny—a
mob of Revolutionary War veterans that surrounded Congress during its meeting in
Philadelphia in 1783 to demand compensation for their services40—was fresh in the
Framers’ minds. Recalling Pennsylvania’s failure to come to Congress’s aid, the
Framers sought to guard against this sort of threat and a more general dependence of
the federal government on any state.41
Although it was clear at the time of ratification that the “Seat of the
Government of the United States”42 was not itself a state, it was not clear that this
district would lack self-government altogether. Writing as Publius, James
Madison predicted that the states ceding territory to compose the District would
“no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens
inhabiting it”; that these inhabitants “will have had their voice in the election of
the government which is to exercise authority over them”; and that “a municipal
legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be
allowed them.”43 When Maryland and Virginia ceded land, however, neither state

39. See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 998 (1801) (statement of Rep. John Dennis) (“From their
contiguity to, and residence among the members of the General Government, they knew, that though
they might not be represented in the national body, their voice would be heard.”); Location of the
Capital, [4 September] 1789, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/0112-02-0247 [https://perma.cc/RVP2-GGYL] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022) (“Those who are most adjacent
to the seat of legislation, will always possess advantages over others. An earlier knowledge of the laws;
a greater influence in enacting them; better opportunities for anticipating them, and a thousand other
circumstances, will give a superiority to those who are thus situated.”).
40. That, at least, was the lore. The soldiers were assembling around Pennsylvania’s statehouse to
demand pay from the state’s executive council, but Alexander Hamilton convened a special session of
the Confederation Congress, which was housed on the same grounds, so that the demonstration would
appear to be against Congress. See William C. diGiacomantonio, “To Sell Their Birthright for a Mess of
Potage”: The Origins of D.C. Governance and the Organic Act of 1801, 12 WASH. HIST. 31, 31–32
(2000).
41. See generally 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 219–20 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of James Iredell) (“What
would be the consequence if the seat of the government of the United States, with all the archives of
America, was in the power of any one particular state? Would not this be most unsafe and humiliating?
Do we not all remember that, in the year 1783, a band of soldiers went and insulted Congress? The
sovereignty of the United States was treated with indignity. They applied for protection to the state they
resided in, but could obtain none. It is to be hoped such a disgraceful scene will never happen again; but
that, for the future, the national government will be able to protect itself.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at
272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The indispensable necessity of complete authority
at the seat of government carries its own evidence with it. . . . Without it not only the public authority
might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the members of the
general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government for protection in the
exercise of their duty might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence equally
dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy.”).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 41, at 272–73. Many have debated whether Madison’s
statement that the District’s inhabitants “will have had their voice in the election of” Congress referred
only to the first generation of inhabitants or suggested that these residents would receive ongoing
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took care to protect its citizens who would now inhabit the federal city.44 District residents did continue to vote in Maryland and Virginia, including for representatives in
Congress, between 1790 and 1800 while the nation’s temporary capital remained in
Philadelphia. But once the District became the seat of government through the 1801
Organic Act,45 D.C.’s residents could no longer vote for federal representatives.46
B. THE NOT-SO-ANOMALOUS DISTRICT

Although incongruous with principles of self-government and federal representation
set forth in the Constitution, the District’s status as a non-state of non-voting American
citizens was not, in fact, discordant with respect to eighteenth- and early nineteenthcentury practice. Today, Washington, D.C. is the only place in the continental United
States where American citizens lack both state self-government and federal representation in Congress. But when the Constitution was ratified, when D.C. was named the seat
of the federal government, and for many decades thereafter, much of the land of the
United States was organized as territories; the District was one of many jurisdictions in
the country that did not (yet) enjoy statehood. Moreover, it would be at least a century
from the Founding before citizenship became coupled with the franchise; D.C. residents
were akin to the majority of American citizens insofar as they could not vote. That propertied white men were denied political rights registered as a contemporary concern, but
the condition of D.C. residents was not broadly anomalous.

representation in Congress. Compare, e.g., STEPHEN J. MARKMAN, STATEHOOD FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA: IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL? IS IT WISE? IS IT NECESSARY? 39 (1988) (arguing that the “plain
meaning of the language Madison uses” is that only the first generation of District residents will vote),
with Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 91 (D.D.C. 2000) (per curiam) (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting)
(“Interpreting Madison’s statement that the inhabitants of the Seat of Government ‘will have had their voice
in the election of the government which is to exert authority over them’ as a concession that those inhabitants
would permanently lose their voice in congressional elections is in substantial tension with—in fact, seems to
contradict—the natural reading of other contributions to The Federalist by Madison. A basic principle of
Madison’s conception of the House of Representatives was that, under the Constitution, the authority of the
sitting Congress over the People derives from the most recent election and continues only until the next one.”
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 41)).
44. See An Act to Cede to Congress a District of Ten Miles Square in This State for the Seat of the
Government of the United States, 1788 Md. Laws 354; An Act for the Cession of Ten Miles Square, or
Any Lesser Quantity of Territory Within this State, to the United States, in Congress Assembled, for the
Permanent Seat of the General Government, 1789 Va. Acts 53; see also diGiacomantonio, supra note
40, at 35 (“Of the five states that offered to cede land for the federal district (New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia), none attached provisos to their cession protecting residents.”).
45. An Act Concerning the District of Columbia (District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801), ch. 15,
2 Stat. 103 (1801).
46. D.C. residents also lost the ability to vote for President until the Twenty-Third Amendment was
ratified in 1961. See infra Part III. Meanwhile, their ability to elect any form of local government has
fluctuated. With respect to the “municipal legislature” Madison anticipated, Georgetown and Alexandria
retained their municipal governments after the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801, 2 Stat. at 107.
Washington City, meanwhile, received limited home rule through a mayor appointed by the President
and an elected council that could enact local legislation subject to congressional veto. An Act to
Incorporate the Inhabitants of the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia, ch. 53, 2 Stat. 195,
196 (1802). After the Civil War, District residents lost home rule altogether for a century. See infra
Section II.B.
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1. Territories
When the Constitution was ratified, its dual federalism was partly aspirational.
Thirteen states entered the Union in conformity with the constitutional framework provided for self-government and federal representation. But there were
also many states that had yet to be recognized as such, territories that were to be
admitted by Congress as states at a future time. This arrangement was by no
means preordained. Given statehood’s significance, the Constitution might have
required constitutional amendment to change the existing body of states. Or, in
keeping with proposals rejected at the Constitutional Convention, it might have
required a supermajority vote of the national legislature to do so.47 Instead, the
Constitution took care to describe critical features of statehood while leaving the
population of this category to Congress’s political judgments.48 Although federalism was the backbone of the constitutional design, and statehood carried with it
prescribed powers and status, the category “state” was fluid.
The Constitution, moreover, had little to say about the territories beyond establishing Congress’s regulatory authority, a grant that immediately followed its
power to admit new states.49 Provisions concerning territorial governance were
instead found principally in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.50 The Ordinance
established—for the territory that subsequently became Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, and Wisconsin51—a system of colonial governments with the prospect
of statehood. Settlers were promised a popularly elected general assembly once
they had 5,000 free adult male inhabitants and then statehood “on an equal footing with the original States” when they reached 60,000 free inhabitants.52 Beyond
underscoring that a substantial number of American citizens lived in non-states,
the early development of the territories yielded two related understandings of federalism with resonance for Washington, D.C.
First, federal control over an area did not foreclose, or even conflict with,
future statehood. To the contrary, federal control over the territories facilitated
statehood. As Professor Peter Onuf has described, “statehood was immanent in
the American concept of territory”; “[s]ettlers could look forward to full incorporation in the union precisely because the national domain was first organized into
47. A rejected proposal would have required a two-thirds vote of the House and Senate to admit a
new state. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 446–47, 454–56 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
48. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union. . . .”).
49. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States. . . .”).
50. An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat.
50 (1789) [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance]. The Ordinance preceded the Constitution but was
reaffirmed by the First Congress. See id. at 50–51; Matthew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory
of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and
Immunities, 120 YALE L.J. 1820, 1836–38 (2011).
51. The Ordinance’s provisions were also extended to other future states including Mississippi,
Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas, Alabama, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Washington, and Oregon. See
Hegreness, supra note 50, at 1845–54.
52. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 50, at 51, 53.
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‘colonies’ or ‘territories.’”53 This had not always been the expectation; many
thought westward expansion would occur in a more bottom-up, organic manner
and political integration into the Union would follow. Recognizing that a lack of
federal control hindered settlement objectives, however, policymakers inverted
the expected relationship: “Congress could not leave frontier settlers to manage
their own affairs until they were ready to join the union. Instead, the establishment of an effective territorial government was prerequisite to land sales and settlement.”54 By the time the Constitution was ratified, it was widely recognized
that Congress would govern territories that would then become states.55 As Onuf
summarizes “the constitutional ideal” of the American territorial system:
“Territories would not be held in perpetual dependency but could look forward to
statehood and membership in the union.”56
Second, and related, the gradual admission of territories as states established
the sweep of the congressional admission prerogative. In early debates, many
assumed that the Northwest Ordinance set forth binding conditions,57 but
Congress treated statehood as a matter of its discretion, and its gloss on Article
IV shaped the nation’s development.58 The admission of new states became
accepted as a matter of political judgment—as fierce sectional and partisan
debates over statehood throughout American history have underscored.59
Congressional decisions have been limited only by Article IV’s restrictions on

53. PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE xxx (Univ.
of Notre Dame Press 2019) (1987).
54. ONUF, supra note 53, at 45. This top-down settlement process was closely bound up in the racial
formation of the nation. The Northwest Ordinance imposed a colonial structure to “Americanize” the
territories, and the federal government adopted land policies to move white settlers across the country,
stressing democratic and constitutional principles “while engineering a dominant racial demography.”
PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL EXPANSION
55, 276 (2017); see also id. at 10 (noting that land policies encouraged westward movement by white
settlers, with the federal government often moving “populations in a manner that enabled the nation to
simultaneously claim fidelity to democratic principles while maintaining racial hierarchies that
promoted white supremacy”). It was for these white settlers that the federal government offered a
temporary period of colonial government as a precursor to self-government.
55. ONUF, supra note 53, at 45; see also Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism and the
Northwest Ordinance, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1653–54 (2019) (noting the expectation that territories
would eventually become states and James Monroe’s description of “the promise of future statehood as
the ‘remarkable & important difference’ between the Ordinance and British imperial precedent”
(quoting Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1786) (available at https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0419 [https://perma.cc/KGE3-GQUQ]) (alteration in original)).
56. ONUF, supra note 53, at 108; see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 446–48
(1857) (enslaved party) (arguing that territories must become states because the power of Congress “to
obtain and hold colonies and dependent territories, over which they might legislate without restriction,
would be inconsistent with [the federal government’s] own existence in its present form”), superseded
by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
57. See, e.g., Northwest Ordinance, supra note 50, at 53 (providing for statehood upon reaching
60,000 inhabitants). See generally ONUF, supra note 53, at 88–109 (describing debates about whether
the Northwest Ordinance controlled Congress’s decisions to admit new states).
58. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union. . . .”).
59. See infra Section IV.A.
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altering extant states60 and its requirement that the “United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”61 Beyond those
Union-preserving measures, the Constitution leaves Congress a free hand in
admitting new states.
Early territorial governance did not have direct bearing on Washington, D.C.
The District was established by a separate clause of the Constitution, and it had a unique
status as the seat of the national government.62 The distinction between territories and the
District can be overstated—in later decades, D.C. was sometimes treated as a territory,63
while territories were sometimes organized as “Districts”64—but it remains true that D.C.
was “sui generis in our governmental structure.”65
The territorial history does underscore, however, that Washington, D.C. was not
unusual insofar as it was a non-state and, further, that nothing inherent in federal
control or non-state origination precludes statehood. The reality of the Founding Era
was a plethora of not-yet-states despite the more rigid framework of dual federalism
the Constitution established. On that continental canvas, D.C.’s status was unremarkable. Indeed, the sparse population of the District placed it well below the
Northwest Ordinance’s threshold for statehood,66 and it would be difficult to describe
1801 Washington, D.C. as a distinct political community; it had just been created
through a federal act joining together ceded lands from Maryland and Virginia.67 This
act of border-drawing could—and did—subsequently generate a political community,
but as in the territories themselves, the community could only be called into existence
by the top-down act of political creation.68
60. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of
States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”).
61. Id. art. IV, § 4; see Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government
and the Admission of New States, 11 J. POL. 578, 578 (1949) (“In no area has the guarantee been so
widely invoked as in the admission of new states into the Union.”); see also Northwest Ordinance, supra
note 50, at 53 (providing that governments of new states be “republican”).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
63. See An Act to Provide a Government for the District of Columbia, ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, 419
(1871), repealed by An Act for the Government of the District of Columbia, and For Other Purposes, ch.
337, 18 Stat. 116 (1874), and An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of
Columbia, ch. 180, 20 Stat. 102 (1878); see also, e.g., Grant v. Cooke, 7 D.C. (2 Mackey) 165, 194
(1871) (“There can be no doubt that the [1871 government of D.C.] was formed after the model of the
existing territorial governments, and is analogous to them in its general provisions.”).
64. See, e.g., William S. Hanable, The State of Alaska, in THE UNITING STATES: THE STORY OF
STATEHOOD FOR THE FIFTY UNITED STATES 55, 62 (Benjamin F. Shearer ed., 2004) (noting that Alaska
was organized as the “District of Alaska” in 1884 and the northern part of Louisiana was organized as
the “District of Louisiana” in 1804).
65. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432 (1973).
66. D.C.’s population in 1800 was less than one-fifth the population of the smallest state (Delaware),
and less than one-fourth of the Northwest Ordinance’s proposed population threshold for admission. See
Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 81 & nn.30–31 (D.D.C. 2000) (per curiam) (Oberdorfer, J.,
dissenting).
67. District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103 (1801).
68. Cf. ONUF, supra note 53, at 91 (footnote omitted) (“Fixed boundaries . . . created communities
capable of enjoying and enforcing claims to political rights that, in the American federal system, could
only be exercised collectively.”).

1284

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 110:1269

2. Early American Citizenship
The legal rights and obligations of the individuals residing in the territories
were closely related to the territories’ status, and, here too, Washington, D.C. was
not at first exceptional. Even as the federal government built territorial policy
around an assumption of settlement by American citizens (or, frequently,
European immigrants expected to quickly naturalize69) and “manufacture[d]
white majorities on the land,”70 it temporarily denied these prized settlers rights
of political participation. At first, territorial residents would lack a local assembly
as well as representation in Congress, and only upon a territory’s admission to
statehood would its residents again “enjoy the full benefits of American citizenship.”71 Like those who chose to live in the nation’s capital and enjoy whatever
privileges might attend that residence, the settlers of the Northwest Territory
were seen as consenting to a suspension of political rights they would otherwise
enjoy in exchange for economic opportunities.72
Even describing such political participation in terms of citizenship risks positing a more solid category of American citizenship than existed in the Founding
Era. Until the Civil War, national citizenship was a thin and variegated concept.
The Constitution itself contained no definition of American citizenship or the
rights, privileges, or obligations associated with it.73 In particular, the yoking of
69. Federal land policy became a form of immigration policy: offers of free or cheap land “were
explicitly intended to encourage European emigration,” and Congress provided in the Nationalization
Acts of 1790 and 1802 a quick path to citizenship for “free white persons.” FRYMER, supra note 54, at
60; see also JASON E. PIERCE, MAKING THE WHITE MAN’S WEST: WHITENESS AND THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 14, 19 (2016) (describing the construction of white racial identity in the American
West); AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 114–20 (2010) (describing how settler
ideals of freedom were politically joined to the subordination of marginalized groups).
70. FRYMER, supra note 54, at 28.
71. ONUF, supra note 53, at 59. The statehood process and the status-based citizenship arrangements
were mutually constitutive; “a majority white population” was treated as “a necessary condition for
statehood.” FRYMER, supra note 54, at 28. But there was also contemporary debate about the contours of
citizenship in the territories. For instance, the Northwest Territory’s first Governor, Arthur St. Clair,
maintained that because the Territory had no representation in Congress or local self-government, its
inhabitants “ceased to be citizens of the United States and became their subjects.” ONUF, supra note 53,
at 71 (quoting Governor Arthur St. Clair). His opponents argued instead that “settlers remained citizens,
even while agreeing not to exercise their political rights for a limited time.” Id. at 70.
72. See, e.g., ONUF, supra note 53, at 74. But see id. at 73 (“[T]he attainment of true citizenship was
immanent in the temporarily defective citizenship claimed by territorial ‘citizens.’”).
73. See, e.g., William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century
America, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 85, 92
(Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 2003) (“Whereas modern citizenship involves a single, formal, and
undifferentiated legal status—membership in a central nation-state—that confers universal and internal
transjurisdictional rights upon its holders, nineteenth-century American governance was precisely about
differentiation, jurisdictional autonomy, and local control.”); see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393, 583 (1857) (enslaved party) (Curtis, J., dissenting) (describing as “untenable” the
assumption that “no one can be deemed a citizen of the United States who is not entitled to enjoy all the
privileges and franchises which are conferred on any citizen”), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See generally JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870 (rev. ed. 2005) (describing the gradual transformation of citizenship
in the United States before the Civil War); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (examining political struggles over American citizenship).
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citizenship to the franchise had yet to occur; even comparatively robust state citizenship did not entitle one to vote.74
That residents of the territories and District of Columbia lacked the franchise
thus imposed a geographical condition on their political participation akin to familiar ascriptive qualifications. In an 1805 case considering whether a citizen of
D.C. was a citizen of a state within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution,
for example, the plaintiff’s lawyer noted: “It is true that the citizens of Columbia
are not entitled to the elective franchise in as full a manner as the citizens of
states. They have no vote in the choice of president, vice-president, senators and
representatives in congress.”75 He then proceeded to draw a geographical analogy
to sex, age, and property ownership:
But in this they are not singular. More than seven eighths of the free white
inhabitants of Virginia are in the same situation. Of the white population of
Virginia one half are females—half of the males probably are under age—and
not more than one half of the residue are freeholders and entitled to vote at
elections. The same case happens in some degree in all the states. A great majority are not entitled to vote.76

American citizens residing in D.C. were not alone in their want of the franchise; this was the norm for many years after the Founding. The franchise, moreover, was itself less central to Founding Era political participation than it would
become in later decades. Other channels for political participation—in particular,
petitioning and assembly—were open to D.C. residents as they were to state
citizens.77
In contrast to the highly anomalous condition of D.C. today, neither the
District’s non-state status nor its citizens’ non-enfranchised status rendered it
anomalous in the first decades of the United States. The District’s establishment
as the seat of the federal government distinguished it from the states as well as

74. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 22–42 (rev. ed. 2009) (tracing the expansion of the right to vote in
the states from 1790 to 1850).
75. Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 451 (1805) (plaintiff’s argument).
76. Id. at 451–52 (plaintiff’s argument). Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion declared that “the members
of the American confederacy only are the states contemplated in the constitution” and that, although “it
is extraordinary that the courts of the United States, which are open to aliens, and to the citizens of every
state in the union, should be closed” to residents of D.C., it would take congressional legislation rather
than constitutional interpretation to extend diversity jurisdiction to them. Id. at 452–53.
77. See generally Nikolas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of Self-Government, 130 YALE L.J. 1652
(2021) (arguing that the historical right to assemble provided a means of participation in lawmaking);
Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2016) (exploring the
history of the right to petition as a way for minority voices to participate in lawmaking). In the
abolitionist movement of the early nineteenth century, a large-scale petition campaign drew petitions
from D.C. as well as the states. Underscoring limits of this form of political participation, however, in
1836, Congress passed the Pinckney Resolutions resolving not to consider petitions “relating in any
way, or to any extent whatsoever, to the subject of slavery, or the abolition of slavery.” CONG. GLOBE,
24th Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (1836).
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from the territories that were its closer analogues, but nothing in its founding
form precluded future prospects of self-government and political representation.
C. STATEHOOD AND THE FOUNDING CONSTITUTION

If the creation of the District as a non-state entity did not preclude statehood,
did any provision of the Founding Constitution prohibit Congress from admitting
D.C. as a state? The twenty-first-century question of D.C. statehood cannot be
settled by the eighteenth-century Constitution. The Reconstruction Amendments
and their progeny have remade American federalism and transformed the question of D.C.’s status.78 But the original Articles and Bill of Rights have important
bearing on statehood. What did the Founding Constitution mean for D.C. statehood in the years before Reconstruction, and do any of the original provisions
foreclose statehood today?
The best answer to this question is that the Constitution of the Founding neither
required nor prohibited statehood for D.C., at least in the form it has been proposed: admitting the population-rich area of Washington, D.C. as a state while
retaining a purely federal enclave—including the Capitol, White House, and
Supreme Court buildings—as the seat of the federal government.79 It was only
with the Reconstruction Amendments that the Constitution came to impose an
obligation on Congress to grant D.C.’s residents statehood.80 As commentators
including Viet Dinh and Peter Raven-Hansen have explained, however, the
Founding Constitution never prohibited Congress from admitting D.C. as a
state.81
The Admissions Clause gives Congress broad authority,82 and Congress has
admitted thirty-seven states to the Union through simple legislation.83 The principal objections to statehood for D.C. thus come not from a want of congressional
authority but instead from perceived limits concerning the federal seat of government.84 First, opponents cite the District Clause.85 This Clause provides for a federal area over which Congress has exclusive authority, but it would not be
violated by a statehood act that left in place a seat of government subject to exclusive federal control. At the Constitutional Convention, delegates considered a
clause that would have authorized Congress “to fix and permanently establish the
78. See infra Part II.
79. See, e.g., Washington, D.C. Admission Act, H.R. 51, 117th Cong. (as passed by House of
Representatives, Apr. 22, 2021).
80. See infra Part II.
81. See Dinh Testimony, supra note 10, at 76; Raven-Hansen, supra note 16, at 168.
82. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
83. See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions
Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 125 (2004).
84. Perhaps the most significant objection comes from the Twenty-Third Amendment, ratified in
1961. We consider that argument below, infra Part III, and address here only arguments based on the
Founding Era.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (empowering Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States”).
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seat of Government,” but they removed this language.86 As ratified, the Clause
sets no restriction other than an upper limit of “ten Miles square” on the District’s
size.87
Moreover, Congress has already altered the size and shape of the District. The
First Congress made a small change to the southern boundary of the District, and
all of the Framers then serving in Congress voted in favor, expressing no reservation about moving the established borders.88 Still more significantly, in 1846,
Congress passed legislation providing for the retrocession to Virginia of the substantial portion of the District originally ceded by that state.89 The House
Committee on D.C. deliberated about its constitutional authority to change the
size of the District, recognizing that this would shrink the territory of the District
by a third, and concluded that it was empowered to do so.90 When the Supreme
Court was belatedly asked to hold the retrocession unconstitutional, it declined to
do so.91
Looking beyond the text and historical practice, some nonetheless contend that
the Framers intended the District to have a fixed form to render it independent
from the states.92 Even assuming such arguments are constitutionally cogniza
-ble,93 they are not compelling. They would apply more powerfully to a proposal
to eliminate an exclusive federal seat of government altogether—but the text of
the Clause would also speak directly to such a proposal. To the extent statehood
86. Raven-Hansen, supra note 16, at 168 (quoting JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 420
(Gaillard Hund & James Brown Scott eds., 1920)). As Raven-Hansen notes, Congress accepted the
cessions of Maryland and Virginia “for the permanent seat of the government,” but the legislation was
not of constitutional stature and could be altered by a subsequent act. Id. (quoting An Act for
Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of the Government of the United States, ch. 28, § 1, 1
Stat. 130, 130 (1790)).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
88. See Raven-Hansen, supra note 16, at 169–70.
89. An Act to Retrocede the County of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, to the State of
Virginia, ch. 35, 9 Stat. 35 (1846).
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 29-325, at 1, 3–4 (1846) (“The true construction of [the District Clause] would
seem to be that Congress may retain and exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a district not exceeding ten
miles square; and whether those limits may enlarge or diminish that district, or change the site, upon
considerations relating to the seat of government, and connected with the wants for that purpose, the
limitation upon their power in this respect is, that they shall not hold more than ten miles square for this
purpose; and the end is, to attain what is desirable in relation to the seat of government.”).
91. Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 130, 133–34 (1875) (noting that Virginia had been in possession of the
territory for more than 25 years since the retrocession and neither the state nor the United States
objected, so the retrocession was “conclusive of the rights of the parties before [the Court]”).
92. See, e.g., OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, DOJ, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE QUESTION OF
STATEHOOD FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 55 (1987), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/
115093NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JZV-KD6C] (“Thus, a federal enclave was created to ensure the
independence of the new government. . . . The basic concern that the federal government be independent
of the states, and that no one state be given more than an equal share of influence over it, is as valid
today as it was . . . at the Convention.”); Raven-Hansen, supra note 16, at 167–77 (addressing the “fixed
form” and “fixed function” objections to D.C. statehood).
93. But see Dinh Testimony, supra note 10, at 83 (“The need for independence from state control or
dependence undoubtedly influenced the Constitution’s provision for a federal district, and it should
inform Congress’ policy judgment. . . . But it is just that: a policy concern.”).
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for D.C. would entail shrinking but not eliminating the federal seat of government, Congress could well determine that specific measures the Founders
endorsed to protect the fledgling federal government had become unnecessary
over time. Indeed, the buffer of the District’s land seems no match for the growth
of the federal government’s fiscal, military, and regulatory capacities as a means
of protection.94 Moreover, the violent storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021
underscores that states might defend as well as threaten Congress and that the
“double security” of federalism and the separation of powers the Founders elsewhere endorsed might in fact furnish superior protection for any branch of the
federal government as well as the American people.95
Focusing on the Founding Era, some have also argued that Congress may only
grant statehood with the consent of Maryland, which initially ceded the land. Because
the Constitution prohibits new states from being formed within extant states absent
their consent, the argument goes, Maryland’s legislature would have to agree to D.C.
statehood.96 When Maryland acted in 1791, however, it “for ever ceded and relinquished to the congress and government of the United States, in full and absolute right,
and exclusive jurisdiction” the territory, which the United States then accepted.97 As
Raven-Hansen has explained, Maryland’s conferral contained no reverter or condition
subsequent, and the federal government’s acceptance of the land extinguished
Maryland’s interests.98 It is Congress—not Maryland—that has the prerogative to
choose to carve a state out of the territory over which it exercises sovereign control.99
In brief, the Constitution of the Founding did not prohibit Congress from granting statehood to the people of Washington, D.C. Pursuant to the Admissions
Clause, Congress could have chosen at any point in the nation’s history to reduce
the size of the federal seat of government and admit the balance of the District as
a new state, with a republican form of government, on equal footing with the
other states. Nothing in the District Clause or Maryland’s initial cession would
have stood in the way of this congressional prerogative. It was only after the Civil
War and the remaking of American federalism and citizenship alike, however,
that Congress acquired an as-yet unfulfilled obligation to do so.

94. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 6, at 314 (“[T]he federal government now has a large security force
and is not dependent on the states. . . . [T]he position of the federal government vis-à-vis the states has
flipped, with the federal government now the dominant party in this relationship.”); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 117-19, at 31 (2021) (“Federal facilities are located in every state and around the world. These
facilities rely on state and foreign governments for services and protection. For example, the
headquarters of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security
Agency are located outside of the federal district. Indeed, ninety-two percent of federal employees are
located outside of the federal district and 85 percent are located outside of the national capital region.”).
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96. See OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, DOJ, supra note 92, at iii.
97. 1791 Md. Laws 573.
98. See Raven-Hansen, supra note 16, at 179–82.
99. See Dinh Testimony, supra note 10, at 82 (“Just as a state may consent to the creation of a new
state from within its borders, so too should Congress be permitted to carve a state from the District of
Columbia, over which it enjoys sovereign control.”); see also id. at 86 (“Maryland has no residual
authority over the land.”).
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II. RECONSTRUCTION, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, AND THE DISTRICT
The Reconstruction Amendments altered the architecture of the Constitution in
ways that unsettled the status of the District of Columbia. Most notably, the
Fourteenth Amendment established birthright national citizenship, made this
national citizenship primary and state citizenship derivative, and decoupled citizenship from race and notions of caste.100 These three intertwined features are
widely appreciated.101 But there is a further implication with particular import for
D.C: the Reconstruction Constitution makes state citizenship a constitutive component of equal national citizenship. The Constitution requires that all American citizens living in the United States be able to claim state citizenship where they reside.
Below, we excavate the claim that equal citizenship must be federated citizenship. We begin with the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause.102 We then engage in more holistic interpretation, considering
how the Clause’s guarantee of equal citizenship is informed by both the federalism
of the Founding Constitution and the citizenship recognized by later amendments,
including the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth.103 In
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
101. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 198 (1998) (“[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment[] declar[es] the primacy of national citizenship and treat[s] state citizenship as
derivative.”); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 381 (2005) (“[A]ll
Americans were in fact citizens of the nation first and foremost, with a status and set of birthrights
explicitly affirmed in a national Constitution.”); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51–52 (1969) (arguing for the structural significance of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “national rule that every person born in the country or naturalized shall be a citizen both
of the nation and of his state”); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2347
(1997) (“The citizenship clause is a second Declaration of Independence, announcing that equal
citizenship would henceforth be available to all regardless of race or prior condition of servitude.”);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1977) (arguing that the Framers of the Amendment “saw
themselves as adopting a principle of equal citizenship, [which was] ‘capable of growth’”).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
103. Id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. Our approach thus tracks Vicki Jackson’s “holistic”
interpretation, Reva Siegel’s “synthetic” interpretation, Akhil Amar’s “intratextual” interpretation,
Michael Dorf’s “incorporationist” interpretation, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s “dynamic”
interpretation, among other prominent examples. Although these approaches differ in their particulars,
all seek to “synthesize more recent amendments into an understanding of what the Constitution as a
whole requires.” Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated
Constitution, 53 STAN L. REV. 1259, 1281 & n.95 (2001); see Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 949 (2002);
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) [hereinafter Amar,
Intratextualism]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 62–63 (2000); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88
VA. L. REV. 951, 952–53 (2002); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal
Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 161.
Although, as will be apparent from this description, our approach to constitutional interpretation is
non-originalist, there is also support for a principle of equal, federated citizenship as a matter of the
Citizenship Clause’s original public meaning. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One?
The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165, 165, 254 (2011)
(exploring the “contribution of abolitionist constitutionalism to the original public meaning of . . . the
Fourteenth Amendment” and concluding, among other things, that the Citizenship Clause “incorporated
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particular, we describe how Fourteenth Amendment citizenship must be integrated
with the Founding reliance on states as the sites of both local self-government and
national representation. If equal citizenship entails full membership in the political
community, then equal citizenship must be federated citizenship.
The Fourteenth Amendment alone did not tether citizenship to political participation; only with subsequent amendments, as well as constitutional interpretations and broader social and historical developments, were citizenship and
political participation bound together. We thus start with Reconstruction and then
look forward to determine the content of citizenship. The meaning of equal citizenship has been most critically elaborated through amendments recognizing the
“right of citizens of the United States” to vote104 and the broader struggle for the
franchise that has connected citizenship to self-government in the republican tradition.105 Understood as part of a coherent document, the Citizenship Clause
guarantees equal U.S. citizenship that entails state as well as national citizenship
and attendant rights of political participation through the structure of federalism.
Because the guarantee of federated, equal citizenship depends on constitutional
amendments and understandings that unfolded for more than a century after the
Civil War, it is unsurprising that D.C. statehood was not entertained during
Reconstruction. The history is more complicated than the absence of a statehood
bill might suggest, however, insofar as the struggle for self-government in the
District informed the broader transformation of American citizenship. During the
Civil War, President Lincoln and the Republican Congress dismantled slavery
and Black Codes in D.C. before the Emancipation Proclamation and Thirteenth
Amendment,106 and during Reconstruction, the city became a proving ground for

the abolitionist conception of birthright national citizenship”); Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the
Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 499, 502 (2013) (examining “the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause” and concluding that the Clause requires
equal citizenship). There is not evidence that the Reconstruction Congress intended D.C. to be a state,
but that is unremarkable. Many now-uncontroversial understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment—
from the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on segregated schools and anti-miscegenation laws to its
recognition of women’s jury service—do not conform to the expected applications of the Framers, and
even most species of originalism do not demand such forecasting. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia
T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011) (“[E]ven if one accepts
that legislative history has some value—and we do—it does not follow that the original meaning of a
clause or text is defined by the Framers’ original expected applications. . . . [T]he text of the Fourteenth
Amendment was meant, as an original matter, to forbid class-based legislation and any law that creates a
system of caste.”). See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public
Meaning Approach, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 451 (2018) (discussing the doctrine of public meaning
originalism).
104. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
105. See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 2 (1991)
(“The ballot has always been a certificate of full membership in society, and its value depends primarily
on its capacity to confer a minimum of social dignity.”); Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the
Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1333 (2011) (“The right to vote is partly constitutive of what
it means to be a full citizen.”).
106. An Act for the Release of Certain Persons Held to Service or Labor in the District of Columbia,
ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376 (1862).
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multiracial democracy.107 Black Washingtonians forcefully argued that citizenship required political equality, and Congress recognized Black male suffrage in
D.C. before the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.108
Although egalitarian citizenship was quickly eviscerated, it was first pursued in
the District itself.
A. CITIZENSHIP TRANSFORMED

The Civil War and Reconstruction Era transformed the constitutional order
with respect to both the federal structure and individual rights, as well as the
relationship between the two. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery
and involuntary servitude.109 In response to Southern states’ Black Codes, the
Reconstruction Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866,110 which provided
an “authoritative definition of citizenship”111 not linked to race or previous
enslavement and guaranteed civil rights to American citizens as such. Soon after,
Congress constitutionalized equal citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment and
ensured federal legislative power to enforce both equal citizenship and the noncitizenship-dependent guarantees of equal protection and due process.112 The
Fifteenth Amendment then more closely tethered American citizenship to political rights by prohibiting the denial of the vote based on “race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”113
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment have particular significance for
statehood. The Citizenship Clause, which marked the triumph of abolitionist
arguments, declares: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.”114 With deceptive simplicity, this Clause established a
national American citizenship severed from race, caste, and state determinations
of membership in the polity. Even as the Amendment privileged national, egalitarian citizenship, however, it did not eliminate or curtail state citizenship.
Instead, it recognized Americans as both citizens of the United States and citizens
of states.
107. See CHRIS MYERS ASCH & GEORGE DEREK MUSGROVE, CHOCOLATE CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE
DEMOCRACY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL 115 (2017); Robert Harrison, An Experimental Station for
Lawmaking: Congress and the District of Columbia, 1862–1878, 53 CIV. WAR HIST. 29, 30 (2007).
108. See Harrison, supra note 107.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Many abolitionists argued that the Thirteenth Amendment conferred
immediate citizenship, civil rights, and political rights on newly freed slaves. See Rebecca E. Zietlow,
The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 407–09, 432–33 (2012).
110. Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82).
111. Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 372
(1973); see 14 Stat. at 27 (“[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States. . . .”); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. James Wilson) (noting, in debate over the Civil
Rights Act, “It is in vain we look into the Constitution of the United States for a definition of the term
‘citizen.’ It speaks of citizens, but in no express terms defines what it means by it.”).
112. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
113. Id. amend. XV, § 1.
114. Id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
AND
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In constitutionalizing equal citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment thus recognized a double citizenship. By preserving state citizenship as a federal constitutional matter, the Citizenship Clause also inaugurated a transformation of state
citizenship into a constitutive component of equal national citizenship. After
describing the recognition of national citizenship in Section II.A.1, we consider
in Section II.A.2 how the Reconstruction project forged a new constitutional
arrangement in which state citizenship became a component of national
citizenship.
1. The Triumph of National Citizenship Claims
Although the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes the Constitution’s first definition of American citizenship, the idea of equal, national membership had deep
roots in anti-slavery activism. Famous abolitionists and “ordinary black people”
alike insisted on an “equal citizenship that contradicted the dominant jurisprudence favoring slaveholders.”115 While some demanded a new constitution, many
pressed their claims under the Founding document.116 For instance, abolitionist
Lysander Spooner provided a theory of national citizenship grounded in the
Constitution’s preamble: “‘We, the people of the United States’” did not say
“‘we, the white people,’ or ‘we, the free people,’” he insisted, so all people inhabiting the United States should be considered citizens.117 Spooner further argued
that state governments had no power to determine who was a citizen of the
“United States government”;118 such a power would invert the constitutional
order, placing state above nation. Indeed, he continued, any formerly enslaved
persons would become American citizens upon a state’s abolition of slavery,
meaning they were “equally citizens now—else it would follow that the State
governments had an arbitrary power of making citizens of the United States.”119
Anticipating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, Spooner declared:
“[A]ll the native born inhabitants of the country are at least competent to become

115. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court 2018 Term—Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism,
133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (2019). See generally MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2018) (uncovering the roots of the Citizenship Clause in
Black Americans’ efforts in local courts, municipal offices, and churches to claim legal citizenship).
116. See, e.g., JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY:
TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, IN RELATION TO THAT
SUBJECT 97–99, 120 (1849); Frederick Douglass, “The Constitution of the United States: Is It ProSlavery or Anti-Slavery?”, in ANTISLAVERY POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1833–1860: A READER 144, 153–54
(C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2004); W ILLIAM M. W IECEK , THE S OURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
C ONSTITUTIONALISM IN A MERICA , 1760–1848, at 265–71 (1977); Barnett, supra note 103, at 165;
see also J ONES , supra note 115, at 4–5 (describing arguments offered by abolitionist William
Yates prior to the Civil War that the Constitution and other laws required citizenship for free
Black Americans). See generally STEPHEN KANTROWITZ , MORE THAN FREEDOM : FIGHTING FOR
B LACK CITIZENSHIP IN A WHITE R EPUBLIC, 1829–1889 (2012) (tracing Black Americans’ struggle
to claim full citizenship in the nineteenth century).
117. LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 90 (1860 ed. 1860).
118. Id. at 92.
119. Id. at 93.
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citizens of the United States . . . [.] State governments have no power, by slave
laws or any other, to withhold the rights of citizenship from them.”120
Such arguments were infamously rejected by the Supreme Court in Dred
Scott.121 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Taney asked whether a Black man,
whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, [can]
become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to
all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to
the citizen?122

Answering in the negative, Taney linked the proslavery Constitution of the
Founding to state power over citizenship determinations. His opinion held that
Black people could never be citizens because they had not been citizens of the
states at the time of the Constitution’s adoption but rather had been branded with
“such deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation.”123 The Court further declared that Congress could not confer citizenship on former slaves or their
descendants because its naturalization power did not extend to “rais[ing] to the
rank of a citizen any one born in the United States, who . . . belongs to an inferior
and subordinate class.”124
The Fourteenth Amendment repudiated Dred Scott’s holding and linked
national citizenship to equal citizenship. Following its ratification, the guarantee
of birthright citizenship is a guarantee of American citizenship that does not
depend on race or state citizenship status. As one of the provision’s drafters
explained, the Citizenship Clause reaffirmed “the first clause in the Civil Rights
Bill, declaring the citizenship of all men born in the United States, without regard
to race or color.”125 American citizenship so reaffirmed is a citizenship without
caste. It is also a citizenship that is not established—and cannot be withdrawn or
interfered with—by the states.126
120. Id. at 94; see Barnett, supra note 103, at 224 (noting that Joel Tiffany’s Treatise marked “the
reception of Spooner’s position into the mainstream of abolitionist constitutionalism”). Spooner and
other abolitionists recognized Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause as an existing protection of
such equal American citizenship. See Barnett, supra note 103, at 208; CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d
Sess. 984 (1859) (statement of Rep. John Bingham) (“[I]ts meaning is self-evident that it is ‘the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States’ that it guaranties.”).
121. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
122. Id. at 403.
123. Id. at 416 (stating that it was “hardly consistent with the respect due to these States, to suppose
that they regarded at that time, as fellow-citizens and members of the sovereignty, a class of beings
whom they had thus stigmatized . . . and upon whom they had impressed such deep and enduring marks
of inferiority and degradation”).
124. Id. at 417.
125. W. W. Wines, Speech at the Union Party in Indiana, Great Republican Gathering (Aug. 18,
1866), in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 IN THE STATES OF OHIO, INDIANA AND KENTUCKY 13, 14
(Cincinnati Commercial 1866).
126. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.KENT L. REV. 49, 55–56 (2007) (noting that “Dred Scott used citizenship as the central dividing line
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In fewer than thirty words, the Citizenship Clause thus marked a fundamental
change in constitutional citizenship with three interrelated features. First, it established “the primacy of national citizenship,”127 specifying that all Americans are
“citizens of the nation first and foremost, with a status and set of birthrights explicitly affirmed in a national Constitution.”128 Second, the Clause provided for
an equal American citizenship, decoupled from race, color, or caste. Prohibiting
the denial of “the legal status of citizenship based on prejudice, or [a person’s]
socially constructed capacity for citizenship,”129 the Clause made “[a]ll citizens
. . . equal before the law.”130 Third, the Clause made clear that state citizenship is
derivative of national citizenship, not the other way around. While prominent theories of American citizenship leading to the Civil War insisted that state citizenship was primary, the Fourteenth Amendment established that an American
citizen would be entitled to state citizenship in any state in which she resided.131
These three features—birthright national citizenship, equal citizenship, and derivative state citizenship—are inseparable.
2. Protections of State Citizenship
Even as the Fourteenth Amendment made national citizenship paramount,
however, it reaffirmed the importance of state citizenship. The Citizenship
Clause diminished the centrality of state citizenship both by introducing the guarantee of equal national citizenship and by making state citizenship follow simply
from the conjunction of American citizenship with state residence. But the
Clause did not eliminate state citizenship as a federal constitutional matter. To
the contrary, it expressed the guarantee of U.S. citizenship as a guarantee of both
federal and state citizenship: “All persons born or naturalized in the United

between those who possess basic rights and those who did not,” while the Fourteenth Amendment
“firmly overruled” Dred Scott and recognized Black Americans as “citizens of the United States”);
Williams, supra note 103, at 546 (arguing that the original public meaning of the Citizenship Clause was
legally equal citizenship and noting that in congressional debates about the Amendment participants
“uniformly endorsed a conception of ‘citizenship’ that would encompass, at least, the equal enjoyment
of basic civil rights to the same extent enjoyed by other citizens”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1836 (1866) (statement of Rep. William Lawrence) (“[E]quality of civil rights is the
fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution and controls all State authority.”).
127. ACKERMAN, supra note 101.
128. AMAR, supra note 101.
129. Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, The Citizenship Clause, Original Meaning, and the Egalitarian Unity of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1363, 1366 (2009).
130. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (noting that the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment is to
“abolish[] all class legislation” and eliminate “the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code
not applicable to another”).
131. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 112–13 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(“A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he
chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the
whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right.”); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
502 (1999) (explaining that the right to travel is protected “not only by the new arrival’s status as a state
citizen, but also by her status as a citizen of the United States”). On theories of citizenship before the
Civil War, see, for example, KETTNER, supra note 73.
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States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside.”132
According to the Citizenship Clause, state citizenship is derivative of national
citizenship: a U.S. citizen automatically becomes a state citizen by virtue of taking up residence in the state, and she is free to take up residence in any state. But
state citizenship is also partially constitutive of national citizenship: state citizenship confers constitutional rights and privileges under the Constitution. As
Professor Ryan Williams has explained, “the right to enjoy the privileges or
immunities of state citizenship” is “one of the ‘privileges or immunities’ of
United States citizenship protected by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”133
The recognition of state citizenship as an aspect of U.S. citizenship was not incidental. It marks a revision to the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
declared that “all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States.”134 Although the Act went on to guarantee these citizens’ rights
against state infringement, it did not invoke their state citizenship as such or cast
state membership as a source of rights or protection. The Fourteenth Amendment
declared these same persons to be “citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.”135
This reference to state citizenship—in an Amendment broadly designed to
superintend state power and guarantee national rights—not only reassured those
concerned about the federal government’s power but also reflected the inescapably federal structure of the Union. Representative John Bingham, for example,
stressed that state governments remain
essential to the local administration of the law, which makes it omnipresent,
visible to every man within the vast extent of the Republic, in every place,
whether by the wayside or by the fireside, restraining him by its terrors from
the wrong, and protecting him by its power, in the right.136

In addition, the recognition of state citizenship within the constitutional provision defining egalitarian national citizenship was consistent with conceptions
of state protection that some nineteenth-century abolitionists had urged. As Professor
Maeve Glass has argued, antebellum abolitionists relied not only on national citizenship but also on state citizenship to inform anti-slavery arguments.137 For example,
Massachusetts lawyers challenged southern laws that subjected Black men on arriving

132. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
133. Williams, supra note 103, at 562; see also, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1415 (1992) (noting that although the Citizenship Clause
“recognizes that there are separate citizenships of the states and the United States, the [Fourteenth]
Amendment does not divide those citizenships, but staples them together”).
134. Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (current version 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
136. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. John Bingham).
137. See Maeve Glass, Citizens of the State, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 893–96 (2018).
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vessels to imprisonment as an infringement of the “state’s duty to protect its citizens.”138
As these arguments suggested, recognition of state citizenship as an entailment of
national citizenship could be rights-protecting. Even as it strengthened national
citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment did not establish a federal “monopoly
over the arena of rights protection in the new America” but preserved state citizenship as well.139
The Fourteenth Amendment’s rewriting of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
notable in another pertinent respect. The Act referred to rights guaranteed in “every State and Territory,” while the Fourteenth Amendment referred exclusively
to states.140 This was consistent with a unanimous portion of the Dred Scott
opinion, not repudiated by the Reconstruction Amendments, that insisted the
Constitution permitted territories to be organized only as future states, not perpetual colonies.141 In the late nineteenth century, many believed that the Fourteenth
Amendment “required statehood for all annexed lands.”142 Indeed, there was an
unprecedented break in imperial expansion based on concerns that inevitable
statehood for territories would mean American citizenship for their non-white
inhabitants—concerns that were addressed following the Spanish-American War

138. See id. at 874, 896–97.
139. Id. at 924; see also Frederick Douglass, Reconstruction, ATLANTIC (Dec. 1866), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1866/12/reconstruction/304561/ (“[T]he Constitution of the United
States knows no distinction between citizens on account of color. Neither does it know any difference
between a citizen of a State and a citizen of the United States. Citizenship evidently includes all the
rights of citizens, whether State or national.”); Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government:
Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 554 (1991) (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated “a fundamental right to protection by the government, with a
corresponding obligation on the states to afford such protection”).
140. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version 42 U.S.C. §§
1981–82), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 446 (1857) (enslaved party) (“There is certainly
no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies
bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to
enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of new States. . . . [N]o power is given to
acquire a Territory to be held and governed permanently in that character.”), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see ERMAN, supra note 9, at 11 (noting that the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments together “obliterated Dred Scott’s notorious deprivation of
African American citizenship – but they did not obliterate Dred Scott’s bar on perpetual colonies and
could be reconciled with it easily enough”).
142. ERMAN, supra note 9, at 11; see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 533 (1871) (statement
of Sen. Justin Morrill) (“An empire may be able, through its more despotic rule, for a time to hold
discordant peoples in subjection . . . [but we must] make such materials sovereign and equal . . . for we
accept for ourselves nothing less, crowning all with our fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. . . .”);
Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Government by the
United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393, 405–09 (1899); Sam Erman, “The
Constitutional Lion in the Path”: The Reconstruction Constitution as a Restraint on Empire, 91 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1197, 1206–07 (2018) (describing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ “unbroken, and still
influential tradition that all inhabited U.S. lands would eventually become states”).
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by the Insular Cases’ explicitly racist justification for perpetual territorial
status.143
Although Washington, D.C. was not itself an acquired territory,144 the constitutional commitment to statehood rather than perpetual colonization was nonetheless relevant. Broadly speaking, the problem of disenfranchised people governed
“under the despotism of Congress” was as much a problem of D.C. residents as
residents of territories.145 More narrowly, shortly after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, from 1871 to 1874, Congress imposed a territorial government on D.C.146 An intermediate step between a brief flowering of multiracial
democracy and complete disenfranchisement of D.C. residents, this use of the territorial form marked an inversion of the usual approach. In the American West,
organization through the territorial form had always preceded statehood.147 In
D.C., for the first time, the territorial form did not facilitate more autonomous
self-government but instead impeded it—a development that anticipated the
resumption of imperial annexation later in the century, and one that was equally
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to equal citizenship.
B. FEDERATED CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

By declaring that all U.S. citizens are also citizens of “the State wherein they
reside,”148 the Fourteenth Amendment not only rendered state citizenship derivative—the simple product of American citizenship plus residence—but also guaranteed a right of Americans to be recognized as state citizens in any state. The
federated nature of the guarantee is widely accepted when it comes to movement
among the states.149 But there is a further corollary: all Americans living in the United
States must be able to claim state citizenship where they reside. Equal citizenship is
federated citizenship; it necessarily entails both national and state citizenship.
143. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 306, 315 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (noting that
American citizenship could not be extended to “an uncivilized race . . . absolutely unfit to receive it”);
see ERMAN, supra note 9, at 12–13; Ponsa-Kraus, supra note 9, at 7.
144. See supra note 9 (discussing D.C. and the ostensibly “unincorporated” territories).
145. See 32 CONG. REC. 433–36 (1899) (statement of Sen. Donelson Caffery) (“Congress can only
govern [a territory], under the limitations of the Constitution, with a view to its becoming a State as early
as possible. . . . People inhabiting a territory ceded to us become ipso facto citizens of the United States,
and I defy any man to show that under the principles of our Constitution they can be governed for an
indefinite period of time, for eternity, under the despotism of Congress. . . . [T]he Constitution
contemplates no other than a federated government of States . . . consequently new Territories must as
soon as practicable be admitted as States.”).
146. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
149. As a matter of doctrine, this is understood as a right to travel, one of the few privileges or
immunities of national citizenship that survived the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873). See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999) (recognizing the right to travel, including a
“citizen’s right to be treated equally in her new State of residence”). Although the Supreme Court’s
effective evisceration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases has not been
revisited by the Court despite near-unanimous criticism of the opinion, the meaning of the Citizenship
Clause is not constrained by the Court’s reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Our argument,
in any event, is directed to Congress rather than to the courts. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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The requirement of federated, equal citizenship is not a requirement of the
Citizenship Clause standing alone, but one that depends on looking from Reconstruction
backward to the Founding and forward to the Second Reconstruction. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s first sentence is the critical connection between the federalism of 1789
and the citizenship of the Civil Rights Movement, and its guarantee is informed by
both the constitutional structure that preceded it and the more robust recognition of
individual political rights that followed.
In particular, because the Fourteenth Amendment did not alter the Founding architecture of federalism as the basis for both local self-government and national representation,
a guarantee of citizenship as full membership requires state as well as national citizenship.150 The recognition of citizenship as full membership, especially through the franchise, has in turn been effectuated by constitutional developments that followed the
Fourteenth Amendment, especially the voting rights amendments and constitutional
interpretations of the twentieth century.151 The constitutional recognition of political
rights began with the Reconstruction Amendments—indeed, began well before them,
through abolitionist constitutionalist arguments152—but it took subsequent legal developments, as well as underlying social changes, for equal citizenship to be knitted to political rights. Although political rights may extend beyond citizens, and citizenship entails
more than such political rights, it is clear today that equal citizenship requires, at a minimum, full political membership. The principle of equal, federated citizenship thus
emerged through constitutional amendment, interpretation, and political contestation
that were inaugurated but not completed by the Citizenship Clause.
1. Suffrage During Reconstruction
When the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and ratified, the connection between citizenship and political rights was deeply contested. While some argued that Section One of
the Amendment conferred the franchise, many supporters insisted it was limited to civil,
rather than political, rights and defined these as non-overlapping categories.153 Language
150. See, e.g., FUENTES-ROHWER & CHARLES, supra note 6, at 1 (“U.S. citizenship is not enough to
vote for national office; one must also be a citizen of a state.”).
151. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
152. See supra notes 116–20 and accompanying text.
153. For example, Senator Jacob Howard argued:
The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the
Constitution. It is merely the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as
the result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the
basis of all society. . . .
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard). Traditional
conceptions of citizenship separated political rights from civil rights; while civil rights, such as the right
to own property and contract, followed from citizenship, political rights such as voting and running for
office were rights earned or the result of status. See, e.g., KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL THE
LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 129 (2010)
(describing conceptions of voting as a “privilege that acknowledged a person’s high standing in a
community, whether that standing derived from his status as a taxpayer, as a property holder, or as a
white man”). But see Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction
Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1209–10 (1992) (arguing that even during Reconstruction
there was an overlap between political and civil rights). See generally HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE
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in early drafts empowering Congress to ensure “equal political rights”154 was
deleted. Given opposition to Black suffrage in the North, there were strategic as
well as substantive reasons for Reconstruction Republicans to deny that the
Fourteenth Amendment conferred political rights, or at least to keep the issue
unsettled.
Even so, the Fourteenth Amendment did begin to connect citizenship to political rights as a matter of constitutional text and principle. After Section One names
as a body the “citizens of the United States,” Section Two specifies that a state’s
denial of the franchise to any adult male “citizens of the United States” shall
reduce the state’s share of congressional representatives.155 As a matter of congressional rather than judicial enforcement, the Amendment thus connected citizenship (at least of adult men) to the franchise, and it recognized that this
political right extended to both federal and state elections.156
Outside of Congress and state legislatures, moreover, reformers and activists
insisted that reconstructed citizenship entailed political rights. Some of the most
powerful arguments came from Black residents of Washington, D.C.157 In
December of 1865, for example, a suffrage petition reminded Congress that
“Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed” and
that “[t]he Colored American citizens of the District of Columbia are denied the
benefits of this conceded principle.”158 Much of the petition’s argument followed
convention by treating voting as a privilege to be earned, noting that Washington’s
Black citizens paid “no inconsiderable amount of taxes,” owned property, built
schools, contributed disproportionately through their military service to the effort
to preserve the Union, and were “virtuous” and “intelligent.”159 But the petition
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20–35 (1908) (discussing the congressional debate over
whether suffrage was a political or civil right).
154. BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION:
39TH CONGRESS, 1865-1867, at 56 (1914) (“Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure all persons in every state full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty
and property; and to all citizens of the United States in any State the same immunities and also equal
political rights and privileges.”) (quoting Rep. John Bingham).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1–2.
156. See Mark A. Graber, Constructing Constitutional Politics: The Reconstruction Strategy for
Protecting Rights 6 (unpublished manuscript), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/
Intellectual_Life/LTW-Graber.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4PH-KRN6] (“Members of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress thought [Sections Two and Three] would most likely compel the South to enfranchise persons
of color and, if not, sharply reduce the influence of former slave states and slaveowners on national
policy and constitutional decision making.”); see also Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of
Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 384–85 (2014) (arguing that Section Two critically
informs Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority).
157. During and immediately after the Civil War, D.C.’s population changed significantly. At the
onset of the War, District residents were overwhelmingly white and Southern, but substantial migration,
particularly by newly freed slaves, made D.C.’s population approximately one-third Black by 1870. See
CONSTANCE MCLAUGHLIN GREEN, THE SECRET CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE NATION’S
CAPITAL 63 tbl.II (1967) (showing that between 1860 and 1870, the Black population grew from less
than 11,000 to more than 35,000).
158. Petition of the Colored Citizens of the District of Columbia to the U.S. Congress (Dec. 1865),
http://www.freedmen.umd.edu/Cook%20et%20al.html. [https://perma.cc/CQN8-WVCR].
159. Id.

1300

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 110:1269

also made a “claim for suffrage” that connected voting to abolition and full citizenship: “[W]ithout the political rights enjoyed by every other man, the colored
men of the District of Columbia are but nominally free. . . . Without the right of
suffrage, we are without protection. . . .”160 Days after passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, Black leaders marched in front of President Andrew Johnson’s
Executive Mansion with banners calling for “[e]qual political rights” and “[u]
niversal suffrage.”161
In Congress, Republican Representatives took up the cause of “Emancipation
by Enfranchisement” in the District.162 For example, Senator Charles Sumner,
who had helped draft the Civil Rights Act of 1866, argued that the Act ensured
only “semi-equality” without the right to vote.163 Other members of Congress
likewise described how enfranchising Black men in D.C. could be “an example
to the whole country”164 and “a pillar of fire to illumine the footsteps of millions.”165 The D.C. suffrage bill they advanced was remarkable for its time in
establishing universal manhood suffrage for local elections. Republicans defeated
proposals to impose “literacy, military service, or taxpayer status” requirements166 and forged a critical link between U.S. citizenship and political equality.
As Senator Justin Morrill stated: “Congress at its last session enacted that every
person born in the United States is a citizen thereof, and entitled to protection in
his civil rights. It remains now to recognize that political equality which is the
common right of the American citizen.”167

160. Id. See generally Roberts, supra note 115, at 71 (“[A]bolishing slavery required granting to
formerly enslaved people the full ability to participate as citizens in the nation’s reconstructed
democracy.”).
161. See MASUR, supra note 153, at 121 (internal citations omitted).
162. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
163. 14 CHARLES SUMNER, HIS COMPLETE WORKS 41–42 (1900) (emphasis omitted).
164. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner); see also id.
at 38 (statement of Sen. Justin Morrill) (noting, in reintroducing the suffrage bill in December 1866, that
it “may be said to be inaugurating a policy not only strictly for the District of Columbia, but in some
sense for the country at large”).
165. Id. at 107 (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner) (“If [the bill] were regarded simply in its bearings
on the District it would be difficult to exaggerate its value; but when it is regarded as an example to the
whole country under the sanction of Congress, its value is infinite. It is in the latter character that it
becomes a pillar of fire to illumine the footsteps of millions.”). Opponents also recognized D.C. suffrage
as national precedent. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Garrett Davis) (“[T]he question whether a few thousand negroes of this District shall vote in its elections
is of very trivial importance to the people of the United States. . . . [but] [t]his contest is but an
experiment, a skirmish, an entering wedge to prepare the way for a similar movement in Congress to
confer the right of suffrage on all the negroes of the United States, liberated by the recent amendment of
the Constitution, the power to be claimed under its second clause. It is following up the tactics of the
party four years ago, when the assault upon slavery in this District heralded the general movement that
was to be made against it.”).
166. See MASUR, supra note 153, at 139. They did explicitly limit the franchise to men, despite
debating women’s suffrage. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Charles Sumner) (noting women’s suffrage was “obviously the great question of the future”).
167. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1866) (statement of Sen. Justin Morrill); see also id. at
107 (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner) (arguing that an educational test would not be a problem for
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In December 1866, Congress passed the D.C. suffrage bill. Although President
Johnson vetoed it, arguing that Black voters would have “the supreme control of
the white race,”168 Congress overrode his veto. In January 1867, before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and the Fifteenth Amendment in
1870, universal suffrage for men in local D.C. elections became law. As the
National Republican declared, “the experiment of enlarging the elective franchise” was first made in D.C., where “the Republican party entered upon the policy of equal rights for all men, and avowed it to the world.”169
Although the connection between equal citizenship and political rights was
forged in part in Washington, D.C., developments in the District anticipated not
only the initial promise but also the dismantling of Reconstruction.170 Congress
had advanced equal citizenship, including universal manhood suffrage, in D.C. as
an example for the nation, but “Redemption” also came early to the capital. In
one decade, D.C.’s universal male suffrage became universal disenfranchisement,
as all D.C. residents were stripped of their political rights.171

suffrage in the District but would be in the South because all Black men needed the franchise to protect
themselves and the Union).
168. Andrew Johnson, Veto Message, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 5, 1867), https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/veto-message-422 [https://perma.cc/PNW2-JYHD] (“[H]ere the black
race constitutes nearly one-third of the entire population, whilst the same class surrounds the District on
all sides, ready to change their residence at a moment’s notice, and with all the facility of a nomadic
people, in order to enjoy here, after a short residence, a privilege they find nowhere else. It is within their
power in one year to come into the District in such numbers as to have the supreme control of the white
race, and to govern them by their own officers and by the exercise of all the municipal authority. . . .”).
Suffrage opponents in Congress, as well as among D.C.’s white citizens, made similar arguments. See,
e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d. Sess. 46 (statement of Sen. Willard Saulsbury) (“Is there a Senator
on this floor who, if in his own State there was such a proportion of negroes to the white population,
would vote for giving the right of suffrage in his State to the negro race? . . . [W]here the races are so
nearly equal, and where it is reasonable to suppose that the ‘paradise’ opened up for negroes will be
filled with more negroes than whites, I hold that I should be derelict in duty to my own race, which I
believe to be superior in all respects to the negro race, if I were to vote to give them the right of suffrage
under any circumstances whatever.”).
169. MASUR, supra note 153, at 1–2.
170. During the short period from 1867 to 1871, for example, citizens of D.C. desegregated the
municipal bureaucracy, founded Howard University, expanded the nation’s best Black public school
system, adopted antidiscrimination ordinances, and removed racial restrictions on office holding and
jury service. See ASCH & MUSGROVE, supra note 107, at 138–39; MASUR, supra note 153, at 148–50,
159; Thomas R. Johnson, Reconstruction Politics in Washington: “An Experimental Garden for Radical
Plants,” 50 RECS. COLUM. HIST. SOC’Y 180, 180 (1980).
171. On the “journey from biracial democracy to universal disenfranchisement,” see ASCH &
MUSGROVE, supra note 107, at 156–66. Among other developments, after imposing a temporary
territorial government, Congress voted in 1874 to adopt a presidentially-appointed board of three
commissioners to run the city. Although proposed as an emergency measure of sorts, Congress made the
governance structure permanent four years later, and D.C. residents lost the right to vote for any part of
municipal self-government for a century. See, e.g., The Crime Against the Suffrage in Washington,
NATION, June 27, 1878, at 415 (“Under this bill not a vestige is left of popular municipal government:
aldermen, common councilmen, mayors, boards of works, school boards, police boards, primaries,
conventions, all are swept away, and the entire government is handed over to three men, appointed by a
foreign authority, responsible not to their fellow-citizens, but to the President and Senate.”).
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2. The Political Rights of “Citizens of the United States”
Although the District quickly ceased to be an “example for all the land,”172 the
equal citizenship that proponents of D.C. suffrage advocated was ultimately guaranteed as a constitutional matter to all Americans—except for D.C. residents
themselves.173 In the decades following Reconstruction, both constitutional
amendments and interpretive developments established that “[t]he right to vote is
partly constitutive of what it means to be a full citizen” and, conversely, “to be
denied the right to vote is to be something less than a full citizen.”174 While most
accounts of citizenship require more than the franchise, the right to vote is widely
understood as a “minimal condition of political equality.”175
As a constitutional rather than purely democratic-theoretic matter, this connection is most clearly advanced by the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments, which recognize voting as a right of the “citizens of
the United States” named as such by the Citizenship Clause.176 The Fifteenth
Amendment severed the link between voting and racial caste, providing that the
“right of citizens of the United States to vote” could not be denied on account of
“race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”177 The Nineteenth Amendment
later provided that the “right of citizens of the United States to vote” could not be
denied “on account of sex.”178 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment (which was proposed together with partial enfranchisement for D.C. residents179) protected the
“right of citizens of the United States to vote” in federal elections without a poll
tax.180 And the Twenty-Sixth Amendment protected the “right of citizens of the
United States” over age eighteen to vote.181
These amendments are best understood not as wholly distinct constitutional
guarantees, but as glosses on the “citizens of the United States” recognized by the
172. 13 CHARLES SUMNER, THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 351 (1880).
173. Equal citizenship also continues to be denied to residents of U.S. territories who, under
existing case law, do not possess constitutional but only statutory U.S. citizenship, in the case of
most territories—or no citizenship at all, in the case of American Samoa. See, e.g., Tuaua v. United
States, 788 F.3d 300, 311–12 (D.C. Cir. 2015). D.C. residents are the only Americans who are
understood to possess constitutionally guaranteed U.S. citizenship without corresponding state
citizenship. See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, Integral Citizenship, 100
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that the Constitution’s promise of birthright citizenship to all
born “in the United States” applies to U.S. territories).
174. Fishkin, supra note 105, at 1333–34; see Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in
American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 451–52 (1989).
175. IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 6 (2000); see also SHKLAR, supra note 105,
at 25–62 (exploring the centrality of voting to citizenship); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 187 (2000) (“The community confirms an individual person’s
membership, as a free and equal citizen, by according him or her a role in collective decision. In
contrast, it identifies an individual who is excluded from the political process as someone not fully
respected or not fully a member.”).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
177. Id. amend. XV.
178. Id. amend. XIX.
179. See infra Section III.A.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
181. Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
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Fourteenth Amendment. Beyond the precise repetition of the phrase “citizens of
the United States,”182 social movements—from the women’s suffrage movement
to the Civil Rights Movement—organized around this very connection.183
Advocates for women’s suffrage, for example, maintained that political equality
and suffrage were integral to full citizenship. Upon ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment (including the introduction of “male” citizenship into the document
in Section Two184), suffragists invoked the Citizenship and Privileges or
Immunities Clauses, claiming that because women were “citizens,” they were
entitled to vote.185 Although the Supreme Court rejected their claims in Minor v.
Happersett,186 offering a “hollowed-out conception of ‘citizen[ship],’”187 the
Nineteenth Amendment not only recognized women’s right to vote but also more
closely tied suffrage to equal citizenship as a constitutional matter.188 As a
Congressman advocating for suffrage could plausibly argue in 1915: “There can
be no logical objection to universal suffrage in a democracy. Indeed, a democracy
is inconceivable without universal suffrage.”189
If the Nineteenth Amendment launched a new “politics of universalism and
equal citizenship with regard to the right to vote,”190 the Civil Rights Movement
critically furthered that work. During the Second Reconstruction, the promise of
the First finally began to be realized. Most notably, Jim Crow restrictions that had
undermined the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee were dismantled.191 Although
Black enfranchisement was the most important substantive outcome of the 1960s
and 1970s voting rights revolution, constitutional and statutory law alike went
further. As Professor Joseph Fishkin explains: “Rather than simply dismantling
182. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 103, at 789 (“On no less than four occasions—the Fifteenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments—the Constitution uses the same highly
elaborate set of words, ‘the right of citizens of the United States . . . to vote,’ and an intratextualist would
be inclined to read these provisions in pari materia.”).
183. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 103, at 968 (“Disputes about the terms of women’s citizenship in
our constitutional order that began at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafting continued for
decades and across generations until women finally secured an amendment to the Constitution
guaranteeing their right to vote. These debates, I argue, are plainly relevant to understanding how the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal citizenship applies to women.”).
184. U.S CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
185. See Siegel, supra note 103, at 971–72 (noting that suffragists also rested their claims on “other
federal constitutional provisions, many of which abolitionists had invoked in challenging the institution
of slavery”).
186. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1875).
187. Fishkin, supra note 105, at 1341. The year before Minor, Sara Spencer’s argument that the
extension of suffrage only to male U.S. citizens in D.C. violated the Fourteenth Amendment was
rejected by the D.C. Supreme Court. See Spencer v. Bd. of Registration, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 169, 176–
77 (1873) (opining that “the legal vindication of the natural right of all citizens to vote would, at this
stage of popular intelligence, involve the destruction of civil government” and that “[t]he fact that the
practical working of the assumed right would be destructive of civilization is decisive that the right does
not exist”).
188. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
189. Siegel, supra note 103, at 1007 (quoting 52 CONG. REC. 1437 (1915) (statement of Rep. William
Bryan)).
190. Fishkin, supra note 105, at 1343.
191. Id. at 1345.
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race discrimination in voting, American law took a dramatic universalist turn,
sweeping away almost all the bases of suffrage restriction that remained in 1960
and establishing a nationwide norm of universal adult suffrage tied closely to
individual citizenship.”192 Judicial decisions of this period tied universal suffrage
to citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as to more specific protections of subsequent amendments.193
Today, although attacks on the franchise and political equality remain pervasive,194 any tenable understanding of citizenship includes political rights. Even if
the argument that equal citizenship did not necessitate suffrage was plausible
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, it has not withstood subsequent constitutional developments. The conception of citizenship that emerges
from more than a century of contestation includes the ability to vote, to participate in choosing the government that in turn binds the polity.
As has been true since the Founding, moreover, this government is in fact two
governments: state government and federal government. The Reconstruction
Amendments and their citizenship-perfecting progeny did not displace the federal
structure. States remain republican units of local self-government and the only
constitutional architecture for representation in the federal government. Because
of federalism’s place in the constitutional structure, equal citizenship necessarily
entails both national and state membership. Integrating the commitment to equal
citizenship into the Founding federalism framework requires that an American
citizen be a state citizen anywhere in the United States.
The guarantee of the Citizenship Clause—as informed by the Founding’s federalism and the Second Reconstruction’s citizenship—is inconsistent with having
a geographical entity within the United States in which residents do not have state
citizenship.195 Read in its broader context, the Clause requires not only that all
192. Id.; see also id. at 1349 (“[T]he basic conceptual link between citizenship and voting is now
firmly established in our law. The only area in which the right to vote has become substantially more
restricted over the course of this transition to universalism is, instructively, citizenship status: it is now a
federal crime for noncitizens to vote in federal elections.”); KEYSSAR, supra note 74, at 228–29 (“What
occurred in the course of a decade was not only the reenfranchisement of African Americans but the
abolition of nearly all remaining limits on the right to vote. . . . The political leaders of the 1960s . . .
journey[ed] from a focus on black enfranchisement to an embrace of universal suffrage.”).
193. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–55 (1964) (footnote omitted)
(“Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in
state as well as in federal elections. . . . And history has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the
right of suffrage in this country. The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government.”).
194. See generally CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS
DESTROYING OUR DEMOCRACY (2018) (chronicling the rise of voter ID requirements, gerrymandering,
and poll closures after the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)).
195. Cf. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 540 (1933) (“It is important to bear constantly
in mind that the District was made up of portions of two of the original states of the Union, and was not
taken out of the Union by the cession. Prior thereto its inhabitants were entitled to all the rights,
guaranties, and immunities of the Constitution. . . . We think it is not reasonable to assume that the
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American citizens residing in a state be considered members of that state but also
that all Americans be state citizens.
Although Washington, D.C.’s status has been justified by the District Clause,
which allows Congress to “exercise exclusive Legislation” over the District,196
this justification fails to contend with the Constitution as transformed by the Civil
War and the equal citizenship protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
successors. Whatever logic D.C.’s status had at the Founding did not survive the
remaking of American citizenship—as the evisceration of the Reconstruction
project in the District underscores. Rather, recognizing D.C. residents’ equal citizenship is a constitutional imperative, and Congress has a remedy readily at
hand: exercising its power under the Admissions Clause to admit D.C. as a state
through simple legislation.197 Conferring state citizenship on D.C. residents is the
only way to recognize their equal national citizenship.
III. THE TWENTY-THIRD AMENDMENT AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
Although Congress has not yet admitted D.C. into the Union, in the mid-twentieth century it began to take up anew the work of Reconstruction. In addition to
passing civil rights legislation, Congress also unbundled statehood and conferred
discrete aspects on D.C.: representation in presidential elections,198 a delegate
(without a vote) in the House of Representatives,199 and a degree of home rule.200
The Twenty-Third Amendment, which granted D.C. presidential electors,
brought the capital’s residents a step closer to the constitutional paradigm.201
Like the anti-poll-tax bill that was introduced together with it, the Twenty-Third
Amendment was a citizenship-perfecting resolution. In the words of the House
cession stripped them of these rights. . . .”); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 550 (1888) (“There is
nothing in the history of the Constitution or of the original amendments to justify the assertion that the
people of this District may be lawfully deprived of the benefit of any of the constitutional guarantees of
life, liberty, and property. . . .”).
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
197. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
198. Id. amend. XXIII.
199. 2 U.S.C. § 25a. A House delegate for D.C. was proposed as part of the resolution that became
the Twenty-Third Amendment, but it was stripped before the resolution passed and subsequently
adopted in 1970. District of Columbia Delegate Act, Pub. L. No. 91-405, 84 Stat. 845, 848–55 (1970).
Congress also proposed a constitutional amendment that would have conferred on D.C. residents full
representation in the House and Senate, but only sixteen states ratified the proposed amendment before
the deadline. See H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong. (1978); Sandra Evans, Voting Rights Amendment Runs
Out of Time, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1985, at C3.
200. See District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No.
93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973). In the decades after Reconstruction, Black disenfranchisement came to be
described as an express objective of federal control over the District. In an 1890 debate about restoring
suffrage, for example, Senator John Morgan of Alabama, a former Confederate general, argued that the
1874 Congress had “found it necessary to disfranchise every man in the District of Columbia, no matter
what his reputation or character might have been or his holdings in property, in order thereby to get rid
of this load of negro suffrage that was flooded in upon them.” EDWARD INGLE, THE NEGRO IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 85–86 (1893). Congress decided “[t]o burn down the barn to get rid of the
rats, . . . the rats being the negro population and the barn being the government of the District of
Columbia . . . .” Id.
201. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
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Report, its purpose was to remove the “constitutional anomaly of imposing all the
obligations of citizenship without the most fundamental of its privileges.”202 The
Twenty-Third Amendment thus pursued the work of the Fourteenth Amendment,
much as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments
recognized suffrage rights guaranteed to the “citizens of the United States” who had
been named as such in the Fourteenth Amendment.203
This Part examines the struggle for citizenship and political rights for District
residents that led to the Twenty-Third Amendment. As the congressional debates
underscore, the Twenty-Third Amendment was understood as a step, but only a
step, toward recognizing D.C. residents as full American citizens. It did not confer political representation or self-government beyond participation in the
Electoral College—steps that Southern Democrats’ strangleholds on key committees put out of reach—but it also did not foreclose the possibility of statehood or
extinguish Congress’s broader constitutional obligation to recognize D.C. residents’ dual political identity as state and national citizens.
This Part then offers a proposal that reconciles the Twenty-Third Amendment
with D.C. statehood. Although the Amendment does not pose a constitutional obstacle to statehood, it does pose a practical complication that opponents of statehood have been quick to point out: What would happen to the three Electoral
College votes conferred on the “District constituting the seat of Government of
the United States”204 if D.C. became a state entitled to its own Electoral College
votes and separate from the barely populated District? The statehood legislation
pending in Congress proposes expedited repeal of the Twenty-Third Amendment
and, in the meantime, strikes the provision of federal law establishing D.C.’s participation in the Electoral College.205 A better approach would be to confer the
District’s votes on the winner of the national popular vote. Such a decision would
not only conform to the text of the Amendment but would also appropriately recognize the “District constituting the seat of Government of the United States” as
belonging to “all the people of America.”206
A. TOWARD “FIRST-CLASS CITIZENS”207

In the years after World War II, Washington D.C.’s status became a prominent
civil rights concern. As the Second Reconstruction commenced, racial segregation
202. H.R. REP. NO. 86-1698, at 2 (1960).
203. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); id. amend. XIX
(“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of
sex.”); id. amend. XXIV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote . . . shall not be denied
or abridged . . . by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); id. amend. XXVI (“The right of
citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged . . . on account of age.”).
204. Id. amend. XXIII.
205. Washington, D.C. Admission Act, H.R. 51, 117th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives,
Apr. 22, 2021).
206. 106 CONG. REC. 12569 (1960) (statement of Rep. Donald Ray Matthews).
207. Id. at 1762 (statement of Sen. J. Glenn Beall).
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and discrimination in the nation’s capital garnered widespread attention and opprobrium. The National Committee on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital emphasized the discordance of racial discrimination in the District and the abysmal
failure of democracy this represented; D.C. symbolized the nation, yet segregation
was more rigid than in the Jim Crow South.208 Indeed, Southern congressional
leaders used their hold on the House District of Columbia Committee to promote
D.C. as the “capital of white supremacy.”209 According to the Washington
Evening Star, “[i]t must be viewed as one of the ironies of history that the
Confederacy, which was never able to capture Washington during the course
of [the Civil War], now holds it as a helpless pawn.”210
As the federal government increasingly sought to position itself as a guarantor
of equality against resistant states, the capital belied this narrative. From segregated schools to the denial of access to public accommodations, the federal government was responsible.211 Moreover, segregation and discrimination went
hand-in-hand with disenfranchisement. The federal government that constituted
the entirety of government for Washington residents was a government in which
these Americans had no voice: citizens in the majority Black capital were denied
the vote absolutely. They could not elect local, state, or federal officials.
“Without any kind of vote, the people of the District of Columbia are mere wards
of Congress,” Representative Emanuel Celler declared. “They are declassed.”212
As all three branches of the federal government began to address racial segregation, they struggled with D.C.’s status as a non-state, a jurisdiction outside the
federalism framework the Reconstruction Amendments relied upon to guarantee
equal citizenship. In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court departed from Brown
v. Board of Education’s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause’s regulation of
states and simply declared: “In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government.”213 Although the Court correctly bound the federal government
to the guarantee of equal citizenship, the school desegregation litigation
208. See KENESAW M. LANDIS, NAT’L COMM. ON SEGREGATION IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL,
SEGREGATION IN WASHINGTON 17 (1948); see also id. at 4–10 (excerpting a story from the Associated
Press about a Russian newspaper’s treatment of segregation in D.C., recounting discriminatory
treatment and humiliation of “visiting dignitaries from certain African and Carribbean countries” and
quoting a “horrified” letter from a Danish visitor noting that “Washington . . . is not a good ‘salesman’
for your kind of democracy”).
209. Id. at 88.
210. Id.
211. Id. (“[The federal government], and it alone, has the power to break the chains that bar a quarter
of a million Negroes in Washington from their equal rights as Americans. Worse, the government has
helped to make the chains.”).
212. 106 CONG. REC. 12557 (1960) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
213. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The year before, in District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., the Court responded to a campaign of
restaurant sit-ins in D.C., holding that civil rights acts passed by D.C.’s territorial legislative assembly in
1872 and 1873 remained good law despite the intervening changes in D.C.’s government structure and
the general repeal of that legislative assembly’s work. See 346 U.S. 100, 101 (1953).
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underscored the structural problems of Congress acting as a state legislature and
of American citizens lacking state citizenship.214
For its part, Congress not only began to adopt civil rights legislation but also
turned its attention to voting rights for D.C. residents. Statehood was not politically feasible, or even the subject of much agitation at mid-century, but members
of Congress began to pursue core features of statehood more discretely. In particular, Congress repeatedly considered—and ultimately adopted in limited form—
proposals to give D.C. residents a measure of self-government in the form of
home rule and proposals to give D.C. residents a voice in the federal government
through participation in electing the President and some form of representation in
Congress.215 As they debated these three measures (home rule, presidential electors, and congressional representation), members of Congress not only noted the
moral stakes but also advanced distinctly constitutional arguments about the
meaning of American citizenship and its realization in the nation’s capital.
The Twenty-Third Amendment, in particular, was understood as a citizenshipperfecting measure, following in the tradition of other vote-guaranteeing amendments such as the Fifteenth and Nineteenth. When introduced in the 86th
Congress, the proposal that would become the Twenty-Third Amendment was
taken up together with the proposal that would become the Twenty-Fourth (prohibiting poll taxes in federal elections).216 Introducing the D.C. suffrage provision, which initially provided for congressional representation as well as
presidential electors, Senator Kenneth Keating declared: “I believe that consideration of this matter . . . in connection with the anti-poll-tax amendment is particularly appropriate. Both are of the same nature in that they are attempts to remove
unreasonable impediments to voting rights. They are both comparable in their
impact and their justification.”217 Keating suggested that, in fact, enfranchisement
for D.C. residents might be the greater democratic imperative:
I do not know how many people in Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas,
and Virginia [the five states that still had a poll tax] will be benefited by the removal of the poll tax. But I am certain that the number is no more than the
number of citizens in the District of Columbia who would benefit from removal of the absolute bar against their right to vote. This is not a mere matter
of numbers, however, but basically a matter of principle. We cannot justify the
denial of the right of a citizen to vote because of his residence in the District of

214. See generally Williams, supra note 103 (arguing that Bolling should have been decided under
the Citizenship Clause).
215. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. Both proposals were added to a bill that would have permitted state
governors to make temporary appointments to the House. See S.J. Res. 39, 86th Cong. (1960). For a
comprehensive legislative history of the poll tax and its eventual repeal through the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment, see Poll Tax and Enfranchisement of District of Columbia: Hearings on S.J. Res. 126, S.J.
Res. 60, S.J. Res. 70, and S.J. Res. 134 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amends. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong. (1959).
217. 106 CONG. REC. 1759 (1960) (statement of Sen. Kenneth Keating).
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Columbia any more than we can justify the denial of the right to vote because
a citizen has failed to pay a fee.218

Although the poll-tax provision was ultimately held for the next session,
Senators and Representatives discussed the meaning and import of the two suffrage measures together.219 Arguments linking the franchise to equality and membership in the political community—and connecting the disenfranchised citizens
of the South to the disenfranchised citizens of the capital—resonated throughout
the floor debates.220 With respect to D.C. suffrage, in particular, Senators and
Representatives described the amendment as a step toward achieving full citizenship for the residents of the capital.221 A frequent refrain—appearing in constitutional argot, as well as Revolutionary-era slogans222—was that Washingtonians
bore all of the obligations of citizenship but were denied the fundamental right
(or privilege, as some still understood it) of voting. Members of Congress emphasized that residents of the nation’s capital paid federal taxes and served and died
in the armed forces and yet could not vote.223 Only enfranchisement would make
D.C. residents “full-fledged American citizens.”224
If members of Congress recognized that the obligations and privileges of citizenship should be reciprocal, the obvious problem was the Constitution’s machinery for granting the franchise: through the states. As the House Report noted:
“[D.C. residents] cannot now vote in national elections because the Constitution
has restricted that privilege to citizens who reside in States.”225 Because statehood

218. Id.
219. See, e.g., id. at 1758, 12556–57.
220. See, e.g., id. at 12556–57, 12852–54. See generally Amend the Amendment!, EVENING STAR,
Aug. 14, 1959, at A12 (“An otherwise qualified resident of this city, the Capital of the United States, is
in precisely the same category as a citizen of Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia who
has failed to pay his poll tax. . . . The great difference between the District citizen and the citizen of one
of these States, however, is that the latter can remove his disenfranchisement by paying the tax.”).
221. See, e.g., 106 CONG. REC. 12557 (1960) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
222. See, e.g., id. at 1759 (1960) (statement of Sen. Kenneth Keating) (“Taxation without
representation is still the lot of our local citizens.”).
223. See, e.g., id. at 12563 (statement of Rep. John Lindsay) (“[I]t is difficult to realize that the
citizens of this great city are unable to express their preference at the ballot box for the office of
President or Vice President. The people of the District are no different than those in the cities you and I
represent. The Treasury consumes their tax dollar in the same fashion as they do any other revenue. No
boy was disqualified from serving in the Armed Forces because he was a resident of the District of
Columbia. The District has a population equal to or larger than several States and the tax revenues from
it exceed that of 25 States.”); see also, e.g., District of Columbia Representation and Vote: Hearings on
H.J. Res. 529 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1960)
[hereinafter D.C. Vote Hearing] (statement of Sen. Kenneth Keating) (“This is America. We do not
believe in second-class citizenship.”).
224. 106 CONG. REC. 12564 (1960) (statement of Rep. John Foley).
225. H.R. REP. NO. 86-1698, at 2 (1960); see also, e.g., 106 CONG. REC. 12556 (1960) (statement of
Rep. Emanuel Celler) (“Technically, voting rights are denied [to] District residents because the
Constitution is said to provide the machinery only through the States. . . . Since the District is not a State
or part of a State, there is no machinery through which its citizens may participate in such matters.”).
The connection between statehood and voting did not seem much of a concern to those who understood
D.C. residents to be transients, citizens of other states who maintained privileges, including the
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and even home rule were politically out of reach,226 proponents of full citizenship
concluded that “half a loaf is better than no loaf at all”227 and began with voting
rights for presidential elections. Importantly, members of Congress did not
understand the Twenty-Third Amendment to impose an obstacle to future democracy-enhancing measures, such as home rule, congressional representation,
or statehood itself.228 They saw their work as furthering District residents’ equal
citizenship, not creating a barrier to its complete realization.229
Their decision to proceed piecemeal rather than through statehood, however,
has had a paradoxical effect. Commentators who oppose statehood trade on an intuitive logic: If a constitutional amendment was required to grant D.C. residents
the right to participate in the Electoral College, how could a much greater
recognition—statehood, with attendant participation in the Electoral College,
representation in Congress, and self-government—be achieved by simple legislation?

franchise, in those states. But congressional hearings on the resolution highlighted the large number of
native-born Washingtonians who had no other state affiliation. See, e.g., Enfranchisement of District of
Columbia: Hearing on S.J. Res 138 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amends. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1959) [hereinafter Enfranchisement Hearing] (statement of Sen.
Jennings Randolph) (“Mr. Chairman, 50 years ago, even 25 years ago, the presence of a large segment of
population within the District of Columbia, who had been born here, was not a truism. But today it
[is]. . . . They possess no validity to claim citizenship within any State. . . .”). Not explicit, but also
understood, was that D.C.’s Black residents were more likely to have been born in D.C. than its
white residents, who were accordingly more likely to be eligible absentee voters in other states. See,
e.g., Carliner v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 265 F. Supp. 736, 738 (D.D.C. 1967) (noting that 27.7% of white
residents and 44.4% of Black residents were born in D.C.).
226. Southern Democrats, who controlled the House District of Columbia Committee, opposed home
rule because it could mean that Washington would be “controlled by the city’s large Negro population.”
Constitutional Amendment on D.C. Suffrage, CQ ALMANAC (1960); see also The Twenty-Third
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1961, at 30 (“One impediment to full-scale citizenship in the District
is that it has a majority of Negro citizens. Some Southern legislators who have their own peculiar views
about human rights would rather not see the District of Columbia governed by a majority.”).
227. 106 CONG. REC. 12556 (1960) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler); see id. at 12558 (statement
of Rep. Abraham Multer) (“There is no doubt that this resolution is a step in the right direction, but I
must emphasize that it is only one step. . . . [N]one who support this bill should assume that they have
done their full duty by the citizens of the District of Columbia.”); id. at 12559 (statement of Rep. George
Meader) (“[T]his is only a partial franchise. . . .”).
228. Although the House Report noted that making D.C. a state would present a “serious
constitutional question,” the only recorded concerns were political. H.R. REP. NO. 86-1698, at 2 (1960).
Insisting on keeping statehood separate from federal representation for the resolution’s chances, Senator
Kenneth Keating concluded: “It is conceivable that at some time the District of Columbia might be a
State but there is certainly no movement now to do that.” D.C. Vote Hearing, supra note 223, at 11. In
1978, Congress did send to the states a proposed constitutional amendment that would have conferred on
D.C. full representation in the House and Senate. See supra note 199.
229. Upon ratification of the Twenty-Third Amendment on March 29, 1961, President John F.
Kennedy declared it “a major step in the right direction.” District of Columbia Wins Right to Vote for
First Time, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Mar. 30, 1961, at 6. Opponents likewise recognized the Twenty-Third
Amendment as a partial step toward fuller representation. Segregationist groups actively fought
ratification. And when Arkansas became the first state to reject the Amendment, Arkansas State
Representative Marion Crank argued: “They propose to create another state. Giving them electors is the
first step.” Morton Mintz, Arkansas Is First to Reject District Voting Amendment, WASH. POST, Jan. 25,
1961, at B1.
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Although paradoxical, the distinction follows from the critical place of federalism in the American constitutional order. States provide the only constitutional
channels for representative government, and constitutional law accordingly yokes
political rights to state status. Upon admission to the Union, residents of a new
state receive an established bundle of rights—particularly the franchise—and
their state enters on equal footing with extant states.230 Outside of statehood, however, there is no established constitutional “machinery . . . for the selection of the
President and Vice President.”231 Approached piecemeal, rather than in the composite form the Constitution contemplates, amendment was required.
B. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AFTER STATEHOOD

What does Congress’s choice to confer a partial franchise via constitutional amendment mean for statehood today? Opponents argue that D.C. statehood is inconsistent
with the Twenty-Third Amendment’s provision of electors to the District.232 Their argument is not a textual one. Current proposals for D.C. statehood would preserve a separate “District constituting the seat of Government of the United States,” as the
Twenty-Third Amendment specifies,233 so the Amendment could continue to operate according to its express terms even if Douglass Commonwealth were admitted
as a state with its own electoral votes. But, some opponents contend, statehood conflicts with the intent of the Amendment’s drafters and ratifiers: “Plainly, those who
230. The Committee Report on the Twenty-Third Amendment appreciated just this. See H.R. REP.
NO. 86-1698, at 2 (1960) (“It should be noted that, apart from the Thirteen Original States, the only areas
which have achieved national voting rights have done so by becoming States. . . .”). Congress had
recently admitted Alaska and Hawaii as states through ordinary legislation. See Alaska Statehood Act,
Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958); Hawaii Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
Some testimony linked these Union-expanding decisions to D.C.’s cause. See, e.g., Enfranchisement
Hearing, supra note 225, at 1 (statement of Sen. Estes Kefauver) (“The enfranchisement of the U.S.
citizens in Alaska and Hawaii (by the granting of statehood to those territories) has left the residents of
the District the only voteless American citizens. Granting of statehood to Alaska and Hawaii has
dramatized the existence of this last large void in our democratic form of government.”).
231. H.R. REP. NO. 86-1698, at 2 (1960). Although Congress could arguably rely on its Article I
authority to grant certain voting rights apart from statehood, this authority does not extend to Electoral
College participation. See Memorandum from Viet D. Dinh & Adam H. Charnes to H. Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, The Authority of Congress to Enact Legislation to Provide the District of Columbia with Voting
Representation in the House of Representatives, in H.R. REP. NO. 109-593, pt. 1, at 41, 62–63 (2006)
(“Because legislating with respect to the Electoral College is outside Congress’ Article I authority,
Congress could not by statute grant District residents a vote for President . . . . By contrast, providing the
District with representation in Congress implicates Article I concerns and Congress is authorized to
enact such legislation by the District Clause.”). But see OLC D.C. Representation Opinion, supra note 6
(“Congress may not by statute give the District of Columbia voting representation in the House. . . .
[because] the District is not a ‘State’ within the meaning of the Composition Clause.”).
232. See, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, The Real Constitutional Difficulty with D.C. Statehood, NAT’L
REV. (June 10, 2020, 2:40 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/the-real-constitutionaldifficulty-with-d-c-statehood/ [https://perma.cc/YJ6Y-VHET] (“Ironically, the adoption almost 60 years
ago of the Twenty-third Amendment, which gave D.C. residents some say in presidential elections,
practically foreclosed almost any chance of the District’s becoming a state. . . .”); Roger Pilon, DC
Statehood Is a Fool’s Errand, NAT’L INT. (ONLINE) (June 5, 2016), https://www.cato.org/commentary/
dc-statehood-fools-errand [https://perma.cc/U2AN-FRPG] (arguing that statehood would require the
repeal of the Twenty-Third Amendment).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
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wrote and ratified the Twenty-Third Amendment envisioned a district of a certain
size,” writes Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute.234
The drafting and ratification record of the Twenty-Third Amendment tells a different story than this argument suggests—a story focused on achieving partial enfranchisement rather than impeding full enfranchisement. In any event, as others have
explained, “the Constitution is not violated anytime the factual assumptions underlying a provision change.”235 Most constitutional provisions operate against backdrops
their framers could not have anticipated. Even if those who wrote and ratified the
Twenty-Third Amendment expected D.C. to have certain boundaries, those assumptions are not constitutional barriers to statehood in the form H.R. 51 proposes.
These opponents are correct, however, that the Twenty-Third Amendment raises
serious policy concerns. Left in place after D.C. becomes a state, the Amendment
might confer the District’s three electoral votes on a tiny group of people residing in
the federal enclave, perhaps only the President’s family. The current draft of H.R.
51 recognizes the problem by providing for expedited consideration of the repeal of
the Twenty-Third Amendment.236 In the meantime, it would rescind the federal statutory provision implementing the Amendment,237 denying any residents of the federal enclave the right to participate in the Electoral College as such and instead
granting them the right to vote in their previous states of residence.238
A better approach would be to legislate that the electoral votes of the “District
constituting the seat of Government of the United States”239 shall be awarded to
the winner of the national popular vote for President, at least pending the repeal
of the Twenty-Third Amendment.240 This tweak to the legislation better comports
with both the text and purposes of the Amendment. First, although some insist
that the Twenty-Third Amendment is not self-executing, so Congress may simply
decline to provide electors for the District,241 the mandatory language of the
Amendment (“The District . . . shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may
234. Pilon, supra note 232.
235. Dinh Testimony, supra note 10, at 84.
236. Washington, D.C. Admission Act, H.R. 51, 117th Cong. § 224 (as passed by House of
Representatives, Apr. 22, 2021) (proposing “Expedited Procedures for Consideration of Constitutional
Amendment Repealing 23rd Amendment”).
237. See id. § 223 (repealing 3 U.S.C. § 21).
238. See id. § 221.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
240. We suggested this after the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiafalo v. Washington. See Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Olatunde Johnson, Commentary, The Electoral College Shouldn’t Get in the Way of
D.C. Statehood, TAKE CARE (July 7, 2020), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-electoral-collegeshouldn-t-get-in-the-way-of-d-c-statehood [https://perma.cc/J9NY-TQYU]. See generally Chiafalo
v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020) (considering state “faithless elector” laws and holding
that a state may “instruct[] its electors that they have no ground for reversing the vote of millions of
its citizens”). As an alternative, Congress could award the votes to the winner of the Electoral
College before the District’s three votes were included. Because we do not believe the Electoral
College well represents the nation’s people, we favor reliance on the national popular vote. But
either would be superior to H.R. 51’s current approach.
241. See, e.g., Schrag, supra note 4, at 348–49; see also Raven-Hansen, supra note 16, at 188–89
(arguing that no one would have standing to challenge a lack of suffrage for the seat of government upon
D.C. statehood).

2022]

FEDERALISM AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP

1313

direct”242) makes problematic the appointment of no electors. Congress’s discretion is better understood to be limited to the mechanics and form of the appointment rather than the fact of appointment.243
Second, assigning the District’s electoral votes to the winner of the national
popular vote would recognize the special place of the nation’s capital as belonging to all Americans. Although the Twenty-Third Amendment was designed to
partially enfranchise District residents, comments throughout the drafting and ratification process emphasized D.C.’s national role and status. For instance,
Representative Joel Broyhill argued that “Washington is thought of as belonging
to every citizen in the entire Nation.”244 Allocating the District’s Electoral
College votes to the winner of the national popular vote would provide legal recognition of the nation’s capital as belonging to all Americans, while also—
through statehood for Douglass Commonwealth—continuing to recognize the
more specific Electoral College participation of D.C. residents.
IV. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FEDERALISM
A conscientious member of Congress should recognize D.C. statehood as a
constitutional imperative and vote to admit Douglass Commonwealth to the
Union. The constitutional arguments to the contrary are feeble—but they are also
not what stands between the people of Washington, D.C. and statehood. Instead,
the decision to withhold self-governance and federal representation is a political
one. Describing opposition to congressional representation for the District half a
century ago, Senator Ted Kennedy noted his colleagues’ perception of D.C. as
“too liberal, too urban, too black or too Democratic.”245 Today’s statehood opponents sound variations on these themes.246
242. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
243. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 21, at 1224 (“The . . . argument that Congress could ignore the
Amendment because it is not self-executing is . . . troubling.”).
244. D.C. Vote Hearing, supra note 223, at 24 (statement of Rep. Joel T. Broyhill). The sentiment
was echoed by both proponents and opponents of measures such as home rule. Compare, e.g., 106
CONG. REC. 12568–69 (1960) (statement of Rep. Donald Matthews) (“[A] Federal city, reserved
especially for the Capitol of the United States, is a responsibility of all the representatives of the United
States and we cannot abrogate that responsibility. . . . [T]he District of Columbia, a great city, belongs to
all the people of America.”), with id. at 12570 (statement of Rep. Seymour Halpern) (“The fact that the
District is a ‘Federal city’ in which all the citizens of the country have an interest is not, in my opinion, a
sufficient reason for denying to its inhabitants control over their local problems. . . .”).
245. 124 CONG. REC. 26345 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
246. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Lindsey Graham, Graham Strongly Opposes DC Statehood (June
29, 2020), https://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/6/graham-strongly-opposes-dcstatehood [https://perma.cc/4RMW-A6ZU] (“At its core this is about trying to add two more
Democratic votes in the U.S. Senate, effectively cancelling out the votes of a state like South Carolina
with two Republican Senators.”); Veronica Stracqualursi & Nicky Robertson, Cotton Says Wyoming’s
“Well-Rounded Working-Class” Population More Worthy of Statehood than DC, CNN (June 27,
2020, 7:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/26/politics/tom-cotton-wyoming-dc-statehood/index.
html [https://perma.cc/RQ7D-DS8N] (quoting Sen. Tom Cotton as saying: “Wyoming is smaller than
Washington by population, but it has three times as many workers in mining, logging and construction,
and 10 times as many workers in manufacturing. In other words, Wyoming is a well-rounded workingclass state. A new state of Washington would not be.”).
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A natural response of statehood proponents is to insist that this is a matter of
principle, not politics. It is, as we have emphasized, certainly a matter of constitutional and democratic principle to recognize the full and equal citizenship of
D.C.’s residents. But it is also a matter of politics, as the admission of new states
always has been. A Democratic Congress that admitted “liberal,” “Democratic”
D.C. as a state to bolster its partisan ranks would be hewing closely to the
American tradition. Given the current bias of federal representative institutions
toward Republicans, such a decision would also be on strong democratic
ground.247 Although partisanship is a legitimate congressional consideration, it is
in the partisan-linked but distinct understanding of D.C. as “too black” and “too
urban” where the most compelling political reasons for statehood are found.248
D.C.’s unique population and geography hold promise not only for the District
itself but also for twenty-first-century American government.
Many of the normative values that courts, politicians, and scholars associate
with federalism—from creating spheres of minority rule, to satisfying local
preferences, to providing laboratories for democratic experimentation—are not
well-realized in practice. But the very features of D.C. that have long impeded its
recognition as a self-governing political community introduce new possibilities
for achieving these values. As a plurality Black state, D.C. would provide a novel
forum for federalism to empower people of color. And as the nation’s first citystate, D.C. would merge federalism with localism and facilitate subsidiarity.
A. PARTISANSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

Discussions of statehood often contrast principle and politics, but statehood has
always been a political question—not only in the jurisdictional sense that the matter is
left to congressional discretion but also in the sense that partisan considerations have
always pervaded congressional debates and decisions. Senators and Representatives
have weighed how new states would affect partisan or sectional power within the federal government and have advocated or opposed statehood accordingly.
Sometimes, such considerations led Congress to admit states in pairs. In the
half-century before the Civil War, Congress frequently admitted a free state and a
slave state in close temporal proximity. Indiana joined the Union with Mississippi,
Illinois with Alabama, Maine with Missouri, Michigan with Arkansas, and Iowa
with Florida.249 As a normative matter, any suggestion that partisan balance is
inherently desirable with respect to statehood admission does not find support in
this practice: it was above all Southern states’ representatives who insisted on balance as a slavery-protecting measure.
247. See generally Jonathan S. Gould & David E. Pozen, Structural Biases in Structural
Constitutional Law, 97 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2022) (describing various “structural biases” in favor of the
Republican party).
248. 124 CONG. REC. 26345 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy). On the close relationship
between partisanship, race, and geography, see, for example, LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT:
HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY (2018).
249. See generally THE UNITING STATES, supra note 64 (discussing the path to statehood for each of
the fifty states).
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But the claim also falls short descriptively. Although partisan considerations
have always informed statehood decisions, twofer admission has not been the
norm outside of the slave state/free state practice. In the years immediately before
and after the Civil War, for instance, partisan “power grabs”250 were instead the
prevailing practice. Statehood for Nevada, Nebraska, and Colorado was engineered (although delayed for Colorado) by a Republican party desperate to hold
onto the presidency.251 In 1889, Congress similarly admitted North Dakota,
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to retain Republican control over the
federal government,252 and it admitted Idaho and Wyoming as Republican-supporting states the next year.253
The return to pairing in the most recent grants of statehood to Alaska and
Hawaii in 1959 has made bipartisan admission more salient, but perhaps more
than anything those statehood decisions illuminate the anomalous character of
mid-twentieth-century partisanship. Although Democratic and Republican labels
are coherent across the country today, this was not true at mid-century when the
parties were regionally fractured; this was the era of Southern Democrats and
Rockefeller Republicans. Alaska was expected to be Democratic and Hawaii was
expected to be Republican, but the main objection to statehood in Congress for
both concerned the effects on civil rights legislation. Southern representatives
feared that these racially diverse states would “help to loosen their stranglehold
on civil rights legislation,”254 opposition that was overcome only after Congress

250. Cf. Devan Cole, GOP Senator Blasts DC Statehood as ‘Power Grab’ in Clash with Democratic
Mayor During Hearing, CNN (June 22, 2021, 8:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/22/politics/dcstatehood-bill-senate-committee-hearing/index.html [https://perma.cc/AY8B-CC42] (quoting Sen. Ron
Johnson stating that D.C. statehood “seems just like a naked power grab”).
251. See Mark R. Ellis, The State of Nebraska, in THE UNITING STATES, supra note 64, at 725, 725
(“Nebraska, along with Nevada and Colorado territories, was targeted for statehood by Republican
lawmakers during the Civil War. Republicans at the federal and territorial levels hoped that the addition
of three strong, loyal Republican states would help re-elect President Lincoln in 1864 and make postwar Reconstruction congressional legislation easier to attain.”); Jeffrey M. Kintop, The State of Nevada,
in THE UNITING STATES, supra note 64, at 753, 778 (describing the admission of Nevada as a means of
“bolster[ing Lincoln’s] chances of election” and facilitating Radical Reconstruction legislation);
William Virden, The State of Colorado, in THE UNITING STATES, supra note 64, at 161, 173 (“Not until
1876, when the Republican Party became desperate to retain its hold on the presidency, did Colorado
emerge as a full-fledged member of the Union.”).
252. See, e.g., David B. Danbom, The State of North Dakota, in THE UNITING STATES, supra note 64,
at 921, 931 (noting that, with unified Republican government, “there was a political incentive to admit
as many potentially Republican states into the Union as possible and to do so quickly, before another
election threated to divide the government again,” so North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and
Washington were admitted in 1889).
253. See, e.g., Phil Roberts, The State of Wyoming, in THE UNITING STATES, supra note 64, at 1351,
1351 (“Like the earlier western states of Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington,
Wyoming’s admission came as a result of the territory’s record of support for Republicans. When the
presidency and both houses of Congress returned to Republican hands as a result of the 1888 election,
Wyoming was well positioned for admission. . . .”).
254. William S. Hanable, The State of Alaska, in THE UNITING STATES, supra note 64, at 55, 72–73
(“Congress’s conservative Southerners had been chronic opponents of Alaska statehood bills, for they
feared that representatives of a new, Democratically inclined state with a large nonwhite population
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managed to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1957.255 The confident contemporaneous
predictions that Alaska would be a blue state and Hawaii a red state also underscore the limits of partisan prognostication; the regional realignment of the parties in the ensuing decades has made Hawaii one of the bluest states and Alaska
solidly red in the early twenty-first century.
Changes in the parties, as well as state populations, over time have limited the
staying power of other statehood decisions based on partisanship as well, but that
has not made initial partisan assessments any less central to such determinations.
The expected partisan composition of prospective states has hastened or delayed
statehood, generated congressional support or opposition, and always been a driving consideration.
The lesson from such precedent is a modest one: not that Congress should or
must consider partisanship in statehood determinations but simply that it has traditionally done so. Arguments that Congress would be engaging in a novel or illegitimate partisan power grab in admitting D.C. as a state conjure as precedent an
apolitical past that does not exist. Wholly independent of partisan considerations,
Congress has a constitutional obligation to effectuate the guarantee of federated
equal citizenship by admitting D.C. as a state, but partisan motivations to carry
out this obligation do not render suspect the resulting action.
The partisan case to admit D.C. is stronger than the precedent itself indicates,
moreover. Insofar as states are both self-governing communities and the constitutive units of federal representation, a Democratic decision to admit D.C. would
be on strong democratic ground. Today, the United States’ “political geography . . . tilts a host of longstanding structural arrangements in Republicans’
favor,” including the composition of the Senate and House.256 Because partisanship is the dominant logic of American government,257 Democrats compete with Republicans on an uneven playing field. The state of Douglass
Commonwealth could provide a partial corrective to such partisan imbalance
might help to loosen their stranglehold on civil rights legislation. . . . An unusually frank Dixiecrat spoke
the unpleasant truth when he said: ‘I’m sorry, but a group of us are committed to oppose the admission
of any states whose senators are not likely to support our stand on cloture. The merits of the statehood
won’t play any part in our decision.’”); J. D. Bowers, The State of Hawaii, in THE UNITING STATES,
supra note 64, at 295, 305 (“Hawaii’s prospects for statehood were mired in a political contest between
the Republicans and Democrats . . . [and] in the opposition of southern politicians who were leery of the
civil rights implications should a racially diverse and tolerant Hawaii join their states on an equal
footing.”).
255. Pub. L. 83-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
256. Gould & Pozen, supra note 247, at 114–15. See generally ADAM JENTLESON, KILL SWITCH: THE
RISE OF THE MODERN SENATE AND THE CRIPPLING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 10–11 (2021) (arguing
that the structural imbalance of the Senate and the filibuster give disproportionate power to a minority of
predominantly white conservative Senators); JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS
OF THE URBAN-RURAL POLITICAL DIVIDE 133 (2019) (showing how the clustering of center-left voters in
cities gives Democrats a structural disadvantage in the House of Representatives).
257. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014)
(arguing that relationships among the states and the federal government are critically shaped by partisan
politics); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311 (2006) (arguing that the relationships among the branches of the federal government are critically
shaped by partisan politics).
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insofar as it would add two Senators and one Representative who could be
expected—at least for the immediate future—to be Democrats.258 To the
extent the celebration of joint state admission speaks to preserving balance in
the federal government, the admission of D.C. alone would more closely
track these objectives than would admitting an anticipated blue state and red
state together.
B. MINORITY RULE

At the heart of many theories of federalism is the idea of minority rule—a population in the minority at the national level may govern as a local majority. As
Dean Heather Gerken argues:
Federalism is an idea that depends on, even glories in, the notion of minority
rule. It involves decentralized governance and a population that is unevenly
distributed across two levels of government, something that allows national
minorities to constitute local majorities. Minority rule, in turn, is thought to
promote choice, competition, experimentation, and the diffusion of power.259

Around the world, federalism has emerged alongside other consociational
structures as an approach to ethnic and religious divisions: minorities can seek
refuge from national majorities and govern themselves in separate states while
retaining membership in the broader nation.260

258. This corrective would be quite limited; no one should look to D.C. statehood as a solution to the
democratic woes of the United States. But cf. Note, Pack the Union: A Proposal to Admit New States for
the Purpose of Amending the Constitution to Ensure Equal Representation, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1050, 1060 (2020) (proposing admitting D.C.’s 127 neighborhoods as separate states). In at least one
respect, D.C. statehood would exacerbate an anti-democratic bias of the Senate: the equal representation
accorded low-population and high-population states. D.C.’s approximately 700,000 residents would
have the same voting power in the Senate as California’s 40 million residents, a skew that has been
widely criticized when it comes to Wyoming’s almost 600,000 residents. D.C. statehood would
somewhat ameliorate the partisan consequences of this skew—the lowest-population states are currently
heavily Republican—which might bolster the prospects of deeper reform. See, e.g., Annual Estimates of
the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico:
April 1, 2020 to July 1, 2021, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?tid=
PEPPOP2021.NST_EST2021_POP&hidePreview=false [https://perma.cc/PZ97-RP3A] (last visited
Apr. 22, 2022) (showing the five lowest-population states to be Wyoming, Vermont, Alaska, North
Dakota, and South Dakota); 2020 Electoral College Results, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.
gov/electoral-college/2020 [https://perma.cc/2ECT-YPLF] (last visited Apr. 22, 2022) (showing that
Wyoming, Alaska, North Dakota, and South Dakota voted for the Republican presidential candidate);
Senators, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/senators/ [https://perma.cc/JHE7-YPQ2] (last visited
Apr. 22, 2022) (showing that Wyoming, Alaska, North Dakota, and South Dakota each have two
Republican senators); Directory of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.
house.gov/representatives [https://perma.cc/RS72-57D3] (last visited Apr. 22, 2022) (showing that
Wyoming, Alaska, North Dakota, and South Dakota each have one Republican representative). But
statehood for D.C. is far from an answer to broader structural problems.
259. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–12 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian
Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1864 (2019) (“Empowering minorities
to rule is part and parcel of American democracy.”).

1318

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 110:1269

Although many accounts of American federalism likewise champion the idea
of minority rule,261 the state system does not empower racial, ethnic, or religious
minorities. To the contrary, for these minorities, federalism has more frequently
been a source of oppression—hence William Riker’s aphorism that if “one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.”262 In addition to the federalism conjured by “states’ rights,” the history of new-state admission has been
closely bound up in white supremacy, with members of Congress seeking to limit
the power of people of color in particular states and in the federal government.263
Even if we could consign white supremacist federalism to history, the fifty states
would remain a poor vehicle for empowering people of color in the United States.
Racial and ethnic groups that constitute minorities of the national population also constitute minorities of the states in which they reside. No state, for instance, has a majority Black population.264 And the political power of Black voters to achieve desired
policy outcomes appears to be still less than their numbers in any given jurisdiction
would suggest.265 State-level governance thus “relentlessly reproduces the same
inequalities in governance that racial minorities experience elsewhere.”266
Scholars who promote government structure as a means of racial empowerment—a
guarantee of decisionmaking power rather than mere voice—have accordingly looked
beyond the states to focus on sub-state institutions. In Gerken’s terminology, racial minorities depend on “federalism-all-the-way-down”: local institutions can foster minority rule
where states cannot.267 Thus, cities may allow groups that function as racial minorities at
the state or national level to govern locally.268 Electoral districts may empower racial
260. See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 42–
44 (1977) (exploring federalism as a consociational method); Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court
2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 102 (2016) (footnote
omitted) (“[F]ederalism allows groups to exit the policymaking domain of the national state and govern
themselves independently. Groups that are minorities at the national level and that are vulnerable to
oppression by majorities can escape to their own jurisdiction, taking control over the policies that will
prevail.”).
261. See Gerken, supra note 259, at 12 n.10 (“Most theories of federalism explicitly or implicitly
depend on minority rule. For instance, states are unlikely to constitute laboratories of democracy or
facilitate Tieboutian sorting if the same types of people are making decisions at the state and national
levels. Similarly, ambition is unlikely to counter ambition if state and national actors are united in their
ambitions.”).
262. WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 (Sheldon S. Wolin
ed., 1964).
263. This was true from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century debates about statehood to the most
recent admissions of Alaska and Hawaii. See FRYMER, supra note 54; see also supra note 254 and
accompanying text.
264. The Black population ranges from less than 1% in Idaho and Montana to more than 30% in
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Georgia. See Population Distribution by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/ [https://perma.cc/
HD5Y-FESS] (last visited Apr. 22, 2022). There is also no state with a majority-Hispanic/Latino
population (though New Mexico is quite close at 49.5%) or with a majority-Asian population
(though Hawaii is the closest at almost 40%). Id. See generally Gerken, supra note 259, at 51–52
(“[R]acial minorities are not the sort of minorities that typically rule at the state level.”).
265. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1527,
1542, 1545 (2015).
266. Gerken, supra note 259, at 51.
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minorities to elect their candidates of choice.269 School boards and juries may enable racial
minorities to make decisions that bind the broader community.270
The limits of federalism all the way down as a strategy for minority rule, however, inhere in sub-state institutions’ lack of constitutional powers and protections
guaranteed to the states.271 It is true that invocations of state sovereignty may
overstate the degree to which states are independent governments, and non-sovereign entities can at least sometimes get their way without legal insulation.272 But
as the exhortation to extend “federalism” all the way down itself underscores,
statehood furnishes unique legal and political authority.
Statehood for D.C. offers an opportunity to realize minority rule as an aspect
of American federalism. Douglass Commonwealth would have the largest percentage of Black Americans of any U.S. state.273 Although the Black population
has dipped below an outright majority in recent years, Black D.C. residents make
up a substantial plurality at 46%, and the District is majority-minority.274 D.C.
would be a state in which Black Americans could govern and set policy, one in
which they were empowered “not just to participate, but to rule.”275 Indeed, D.C.
would be among the most racially diverse states in the country, with substantial
Black, white, and Latino populations, as well as a small, but significant, Asian
population.276 The multiracial composition of D.C. would allow for the emergence of state-level legislative and policy innovations responsive to the needs of
a racially diverse, urban constituency. It would also provide opportunities for
intra-racial diversity to emerge insofar as there would be no felt need to unite
against racially polarized opposition.277
267. Id. at 47 (noting that “[local] institutions are small enough to benefit two groups that are
generally too small to control at the state level: racial minorities and dissenters” and that “[f]ederalism
reimagined thus reveals that the benefits of minority control can extend not just to Southern racists, but
to blacks and Latinos”).
268. Cf. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“It is a welcome symbol of racial progress when the former capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly
to confront the effects of racial discrimination in its midst.”).
269. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 74–77 (1986); Pamela
S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
83, 88. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (providing alternatives to winner-take-all districting to empower
racial and political minorities).
270. Gerken, supra note 259, at 23–26.
271. See infra Section IV.C.
272. See Gerken, supra note 259, at 12–13.
273. Population Distribution by Race/Ethnicity, supra note 264.
274. QuickFacts: District of Columbia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2021), https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/DC [https://perma.cc/2HSS-MMQE]. The white non-Hispanic population is 37.5%; the
Hispanic/Latino population is 11.3%; and the Asian population is 4.5%. Id.
275. Gerken, supra note 259, at 56; cf. Blackhawk, supra note 259 (arguing for the importance of
structure over rights as an empowerment strategy for Native Nations).
276. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005)
(describing democratic benefits of majority- but not exclusively-minority institutions).
277. Cf. Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 781 (2008) (“Within a
majority-minority district, minority members who once banded together defensively against the white majority are
liberated to explore intragroup differences and disagreements. . . . Once a majority-minority district obviates the
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D.C. statehood thus presents the possibility of realizing the aspirations of
Black Washingtonians who endeavored in the face of nineteenth-century racism
to construct a democratic space through educational, faith, and civic associations;
newspapers; and cultural institutions.278 More than a century after Reconstruction
held out the fleeting promise of majority Black state governments, D.C. statehood
could resurrect multiracial federalism for the twenty-first century.
C. LOCALISM AND THE CITY-STATE

If the argument that D.C. is “too black” for statehood is today only uttered
through dog whistles, the argument that it is “too urban”—a point bound up in its
racial composition and partisan identity—is recited aloud.279 D.C. would be the
only American state that is also a city. Although opponents sometimes suggest a
city cannot be a state, there is no such legal or structural prohibition, and federalism’s most celebrated values might be best realized through a city-state.
The normative values associated with federalism are often values of subsidiarity, promoted better by local governments. From participation, to experimentation, to diversity, to competition for a mobile citizenry, these ends may be better
realized by cities and towns than by states.280 Cities, in particular, may also be
sites of “public freedom” and civic solidarity.281
Federalism doctrine does not furnish protection for cities, however. To the contrary, it treats local governments as creatures of their states. “[T]he American
legal system has chosen to create cities that are powerless to act on their own

need to cohere against racially polarized opposition, minority citizens can consider more nuanced differences
among them than would have otherwise been advisable.”).
278. See Rona M. Frederick & Jenice L. View, Facing the Rising Sun: A History of Black Educators
in Washington, DC, 1800-2008, 44 URB. EDUC. 571, 575–76 (2009) (describing Black educational and
cultural institutions in the antebellum and Reconstruction period in D.C.); supra note 170 (noting varied
civic and educational institutions developed by Black Washingtonians in the Reconstruction era).
279. 124 CONG. REC. 26345 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy); see, e.g., Stracqualursi &
Robertson, supra note 246 (quoting Sen. Tom Cotton).
280. Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1312–16 (1994) (“[I]t would seem that the characteristics of the
states and of federalism that promote these values are even more pronounced at the local level.”);
Richard Briffault, Essay, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 2018–19
(2018) [hereinafter Briffault, New Preemption] (“The Court’s normative concerns with responsiveness
to diverse needs in a heterogeneous society, innovation and experimentation, and citizen involvement in
democratic processes apply even more to local governments than to states.”); see also, e.g., Richard C.
Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1233 (2018) (“City power is necessary
to vindicate the values of diversity, majority rule, and local self-government.”); David J. Barron, The
Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 489–90 (1999)
(building a theory of “local constitutionalism”).
281. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 60
(1999) (noting that cities “offer the possibility of dealing with the problematic nature of group power by
reinvigorating the idea of ‘the public’”); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 237 (1990) (“By ‘city life’ I mean a form of social relations which I define as the being
together of strangers. In the city persons and groups interact within spaces and institutions they all
experience themselves as belonging to, but without those interactions dissolving into unity or
commonness.”).
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initiative,” writes Professor Jerry Frug.282 “A city is the only collective body in
America that cannot do something simply because it decides to do it.”283
Beyond such legally constructed city powerlessness, states have not hesitated to
more actively override and incapacitate their urban centers.284 State officials have
frequently hindered local self-government precisely because of the “responsiveness of local governments to citizen engagement, their attentiveness to distinctly
local preferences and concerns, and their policy innovations intended to address
local problems.”285 Although the United States is an urban nation—all but a handful of states have a majority urban population, and most have a supermajority
urban population286—electoral districting (both as it reflects the residential patterns of metropolitan and rural areas themselves287 and as it is exacerbated by
gerrymandering288) gives outsized influence to rural areas in state legislatures.289
The resulting state legislative “attack” on cities290 has been most visible with
respect to preemption. On specific policy issues ranging from environmental protection,291 to workplace regulation,292 to transgender rights,293 to immigration,294

282. FRUG, supra note 281, at 5.
283. Id.
284. See Schragger, supra note 280, at 1164–65 (describing state preemption of local health, labor,
and civil rights laws); Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1–The Urban Disadvantage in
National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 291 (2016) (showing how partisan gerrymandering,
redistricting, and other factors systemically operate to disadvantage urban areas in federal and state
lawmaking).
285. Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 280, at 2019.
286. Adriana Lopez, The Most Urbanized States, PORCH (Mar. 30, 2021), https://porch.com/advice/
most-urbanized-states [https://perma.cc/MWZ9-QE6B]; Urban Percentage of the Population for States,
Historical, IOWA ST. UNIV.: IOWA CMTY. INDICATORS PROGRAM, https://www.icip.iastate.edu/tables/
population/urban-pct-states [https://perma.cc/9TF5-J96G] (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
287. See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography
and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 239 (2013).
288. See Diller, supra note 284 (showing that since 2000 “Republican state legislatures have
exacerbated the urban disadvantage by intentionally gerrymandering U.S. House and state legislative
districts to favor the political preferences of exurban and rural areas.”).
289. See Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1761 (2021).
290. Schragger, supra note 280, at 1232.
291. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2021) (prohibiting local governments from enacting
fracking bans); Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENV’T L.
REV. 293, 295–96 (2016).
292. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 123.1381–.1396 (2021) (prohibiting local governments from
regulating paid sick days, wages, scheduling, and hours or benefits disputes); FLA. STAT. § 218.077(2)
(2021) (prohibiting local governments from establishing a minimum wage different than the state or
federal minimum wage); MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-1-51(1) (2021) (prohibiting local governments from
requiring mandatory minimum sick days for employees); Olatunde C. A. Johnson, The Future of Labor
Localism in an Age of Preemption, 74 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 1179, 1179 (2021) (explaining the rise
of state preemption of local minimum wage, sick leave, and employment discrimination innovations).
293. See, e.g., H.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016) (preempting Charlotte, N.C.,
Ordinance 7056-X (Feb. 22, 2016), which allows individuals to use the bathroom that corresponds to
their gender identity), repealed in part and amended in part by H.B. 142, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2017)).
294. See, e.g., S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (barring local officials from adopting any
ordinance, rule, or practice that limits the enforcement of federal immigration law); Pratheepan
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and more,295 state governments have overridden cities’ attempts to set locally responsive policy.296 This preemption has grown more sweeping and vitriolic in
recent years. In contrast to traditional analysis focused on conflicts between state
and local law, “the new” or “hyper” preemption “clearly, intentionally, extensively, and at times punitively bar[s] local efforts to address a host of local problems.”297 It is aimed less at avoiding or mitigating conflict than at preventing
local regulation outright. Some preemptive laws not only invalidate local rules
but also impose penalties on local officials for adopting such rules.298 Others seek
to foreclose altogether the mere prospect of local regulation.299 And time and
again, these preemptive measures target cities specifically.300
Beyond preemption, state legislatures also hinder city attempts at self-government
in other ways, both deliberate and incidental. For example, states have restricted local
governments’ revenue-raising capacities while also shifting fiscal responsibilities onto
them.301
Although many commentators seek to harness federalism to respond to intrastate preemption and anti-urban regulation, federalism doctrine as such furnishes
no protection to sub-state entities. Other challenges to anti-local regulation may
yet prove successful,302 but federalism’s empowerment of states remains far more
Gulasekaram, Rick Su & Rose Cuison Villazor, Essay, Anti-Sanctuary and Immigration Localism, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 837, 848 (2019).
295. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.
J. 954, 964–68 (2019) (collecting state preemption measures across a “range of policy areas”).
296. See, e.g., Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local
Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS 403, 403 (2017); Richard C. Schragger, Federalism, Metropolitanism,
and the Problem of States, 105 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1571 (2019) (“The new state law preemption is not
indifferent to the site of local regulation; it is aggressively anti-city.”).
297. Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 280, at 1997; see Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A
Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469, 1473 (2018) (“‘[H]yper preemption,’ seeks
not just to curtail local government policy authority over a specific subject, but to broadly discourage local
governments from exercising policy authority in the first place.”).
298. See Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 280, at 2002–07; Schragger, supra note 280, at 1181–83.
299. See Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 280, at 2007–08; cf. Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A.
Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (2020)
(analyzing state displacement of local “structural authority” to design institutions).
300. Indeed, while the partisan account of red states preempting blue cities has much explanatory
force, blue states also preempt their urban centers, albeit to a lesser degree. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley,
Cuomo Blocks New York City Plastic Bag Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/14/nyregion/cuomo-blocks-new-york-city-plastic-bag-law.html.
301. See Schragger, supra note 296, at 1572 (“[R]evenue restrictions are part of a nationwide antiregulatory agenda that seems to target cities, even as those cities seek to raise and spend locally sourced
tax dollars.”); id. at 1577 (describing “unfunded mandates coupled with reduced state aid”); see also
GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 80–82
(2008) (discussing cities with restricted capacity to raise revenue); Yunji Kim & Mildred E. Warner,
Shrinking Local Autonomy: Corporate Coalitions and the Subnational State, 11 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS,
ECON. & SOC’Y 427, 427–28 (2018) (analyzing “state rescaling,” in which the “subnational state uses the
federalist structure to dump fiscal responsibilities to lower levels”).
302. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 292, at 1193–96 (analyzing equal protection constraints); see also
Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 280, at 2022 (proposing an approach to preemption focused on
“whether a state law unduly impinges on the local capacity for self-governance”); cf. Rick Su, Intrastate
Federalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 191, 244–46 (2016) (discussing federal preemption of state
preemption of local regulation).
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likely to limit city power.303 In the extant fifty states, federalism and localism are
set up to clash, and the state is set up to win.304
As with minority rule, Douglass Commonwealth could offer a necessarily discrete but powerful corrective and counterexample. An entirely urban jurisdiction,
D.C. would be the United States’ first city-state.305 Privileging urban over rural,
D.C. would thus uniquely yoke federalism to localism, state power to city power.
As a practical matter, this would mean that state-local preemption and anti-urban
regulation had no purchase in D.C. There would be no rural or suburban interests to
override city governance. The precise correspondence of city and state would immediately dissolve pervasive problems of malapportionment and thorny questions of home
rule. Risks of local decisionmaking that have been cited in the preemption context—in
particular, parochialism, exclusion, and spillover effects—would not be obviated by a
city-state amalgam.306 D.C. would continue to be embedded in a broader metropolitan
region, and line-drawing questions about where authority should reside and how competing interests should be accommodated would continue to arise. But these jurisdictional conflicts are inescapable in a federal system, and a D.C. city-state could enrich
existing experiments in the mid-Atlantic area with regional cooperation.307 As a practical matter, merging city with state would reduce jurisdictional conflict while eliminating forms of state-city domination.
As a more theoretical matter, D.C. statehood could also reduce the distance
between American federalism and subsidiarity, and better instantiate federalism’s
values. Insofar as local governments may already be better than states at fostering
participation, experimentation, and responsiveness to diverse needs but lack legal
power to further these ends in the face of state resistance, D.C. would be uniquely

303. See Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 280, at 2008 (“Existing legal doctrines provide local
governments with few protections against state preemption. Federal constitutional law treats state-local
relations as almost entirely a matter for the states.”).
304. See Schragger, supra note 280, at 1232 (“Anti-urbanism is . . . deeply embedded in the structure
of American federalism. . . .”).
305. Cf. Chrystie Flournoy Swiney & Sheila Foster, Cities Are Rising in Influence and Power on the
Global Stage, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Apr. 15, 2019, 10:34 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-04-15/denied-by-united-nations-cities-make-global-pacts [https://perma.cc/8PHZ-E2EK] (“Cities are
more involved in international policy-making, more savvy at navigating the international halls of power,
more ambitious about voicing their opinions at the global level, and more influential in shaping global
initiatives than perhaps at any time since Italy’s city-states dominated during the Renaissance.”).
306. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 295, at 976–77 (citing as the flip side of localism’s positive
values the risks of “lack of democratic engagement at the local level,” “exclusion,” “externalities and
spillover effects,” and “a particularly toxic vein of local parochialism that hardens a range of
socioeconomic and racial inequalities”).
307. See WILLOW LUNG-AMAM, AN EQUITABLE FUTURE FOR THE WASHINGTON, DC REGION?: A
“REGIONALISM LIGHT” APPROACH TO BUILDING INCLUSIVE NEIGHBORHOODS 5–6 (2017), www.jchs.harvard.
edu/sites/default/files/a_shared_future_equitable_future_washington_dc.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3KA-UEFP]
(describing efforts of regional cooperation in the Washington metropolitan area to produce more affordable
housing). Stronger regional planning might help diminish inequality, and advance inclusive economic
growth and the delivery of government services. Cf. Yonah Freemark, Justin Steil & Kathleen Thelen,
Varieties of Urbanism: A Comparative View of Inequality and the Dual Dimensions of Metropolitan
Fragmentation, 48 J. POL. & SOC’Y 235, 240, 255 (2020) (detailing how metropolitan fragmentation
contributes to inequality and describing features of strong regional planning and governance approaches).
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positioned to do so. As a city-state, it could be the sort of laboratory of democracy
American federalism discourse celebrates but rarely realizes.308
CONCLUSION
“Statehood for the District of Columbia is not a racial issue. It is not a civil rights
issue. It is a constitutional issue that goes to the very foundation of our federal
union,”309 declares the 1987 Office of Legal Policy (OLP) report that remains a
touchstone for statehood opponents. To the contrary, as we have argued, D.C. statehood can only be understood as a racial issue, a civil rights issue, and a constitutional
issue—one because it is another. The Constitution makes state citizenship a constitutive component of national citizenship and requires that all American citizens living in the United States also be able to claim state citizenship where they reside.
Equal citizenship is federated citizenship.
“A change in the status of the District of Columbia,” the OLP report continues,
“would signal a substantial change in our form of federalism.”310 In certain respects,
this is true. As a plurality Black city-state, D.C. would be different from the existing
fifty states in ways that could uniquely further federalism’s values of minority rule,
subsidiarity, and democratic experimentation. But insofar as the OLP report implies
that the admission of D.C. as a state would be an act discontinuous with the development of American federalism, the argument has it backwards. The report is symptomatic of a broader constitutional sclerosis. For most of American history, states
were admitted with regularity.311 The expansion and renewal of the Union within an
established federalism framework was part of the constitutional design: the document specified powers and responsibilities of states and the federal government as a
matter of fundamental law but left it to Congress, through ordinary politics, to shape
the contours of the nation.312 As a result, the history of the United States can largely
be told through the history of state admission. From the status of Black Americans,
Asian-Americans, and Native Nations; to sectional divisions; to religious freedom;
to women’s suffrage; and more, debates about national character and American
democracy have also been debates about admitting new states.
Today, there is a chance to write a new chapter. Admitting D.C. as a state would,
most importantly, fulfill Congress’s as yet unrealized constitutional obligation to
effectuate the equal citizenship guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment within the
framework of American federalism. More than two hundred years after the Founding,
it would also confirm that the United States remains a work in progress, a nation
still capable of renewing its commitment to becoming a “more perfect Union.”313
308. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
309. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, DOJ, supra note 92, at 50.
310. Id. (“The issue should be dealt with on that level, and not on the level of racial politics.”).
311. Until the period between Arizona’s admission in 1912 and Hawaii’s admission in 1959, the
longest the nation had gone between admitting states was fifteen years (Missouri in 1821 to Arkansas in
1836). We are currently inhabiting the longest period with no new state. See generally THE UNITING
STATES, supra note 64 (describing each state’s journey to statehood).
312. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
313. U.S. CONST. pmbl.

